That was interesting that you mention the ‘fixed head 500’ being unreliable because only yesterday I was chatting with a retired former bus company mechanic who told me that it was strange that the 500 was so bad in a truck yet in plant and bus applications it was pretty much trouble free? 
I was mentioning about how unreliable some Cat engines were in trucks a few years ago but superb in plant and he used the 500 as a similar example. Apologies for going slightly off topic.
Pete.
Carryfast:
Ironically the Rover/Triumph switch to fwd Jap crap knock offs was on his watch…
The senior engineers involved with setting up Triumph Acclaim production had nothing but respect for the detail design of the car. Sure, the styling was rubbish, and the specification mediocre, but it was properly engineered. If nothing else, it gave a lesson to the young engineers that the Group was recruiting.
[zb]
anorak:Carryfast:
Ironically the Rover/Triumph switch to fwd Jap crap knock offs was on his watch…The senior engineers involved with setting up Triumph Acclaim production had nothing but respect for the detail design of the car. Sure, the styling was rubbish, and the specification mediocre, but it was properly engineered. If nothing else, it gave a lesson to the young engineers that the Group was recruiting.
But those ‘engineers’,like Rover’s,were obviously working to the same plan of sabotage and industrial espionage as BMC’s when Westminster and Cambridge production was ended in favour of Allegro and Maxi etc.IE how can we build the best possible piece of poverty spec junk that will really ■■■■ off our core customers so that they’ll never come back and they’ll buy a 5 series BMW or a Granada instead.The rest is history.Then Ford and GM did the same in the case of replacing Granada and Carlton with Mondeo and Vectra when they found they were hitting the big two established German marques.
gingerfold:
…
There are as many reasons for the failure of BL as there were vehicle marques and models in its portfolio of brands during its existence, and even in recent months I have unearthed unknown or forgotten snippets of information. The recent death of Sir Michael Edwardes had me researching his career at the helm of BL. At the distance of 40 years since he took charge of BL I believe that the pity was that he wasn’t appointed a few years earlier. Yes, he was a totally ruthless manager who had to focus all his energy into the car making divisions and their horrendous problems. He eschewed the centralised Leyland management structure he inherited. The devolved management he introduced to Jaguar and Land Rover transformed the fortunes of those marques. Now, imagine if he had been appointed say, in 1972, and given devolved management to Leyland, AEC, Scammell, and Guy, would it, could it all have been different? The premium heavy vehicles divisions were profitable and they had nothing like the industrial relations problems of the car making factories. It might just have given us a British commercial vehicle industry to this day.
The separation of the constituent parts of British Leyland was already considered desirable in 1977:
windrush:
That was interesting that you mention the ‘fixed head 500’ being unreliable because only yesterday I was chatting with a retired former bus company mechanic who told me that it was strange that the 500 was so bad in a truck yet in plant and bus applications it was pretty much trouble free?Pete.
Apart from the unreliability in service of the 500 series engine it was also a difficult engine to produce. Rejection rates off the assembly line were in above 30% at one stage.
[zb]
anorak:gingerfold:
…
There are as many reasons for the failure of BL as there were vehicle marques and models in its portfolio of brands during its existence, and even in recent months I have unearthed unknown or forgotten snippets of information. The recent death of Sir Michael Edwardes had me researching his career at the helm of BL. At the distance of 40 years since he took charge of BL I believe that the pity was that he wasn’t appointed a few years earlier. Yes, he was a totally ruthless manager who had to focus all his energy into the car making divisions and their horrendous problems. He eschewed the centralised Leyland management structure he inherited. The devolved management he introduced to Jaguar and Land Rover transformed the fortunes of those marques. Now, imagine if he had been appointed say, in 1972, and given devolved management to Leyland, AEC, Scammell, and Guy, would it, could it all have been different? The premium heavy vehicles divisions were profitable and they had nothing like the industrial relations problems of the car making factories. It might just have given us a British commercial vehicle industry to this day.The separation of the constituent parts of British Leyland was already considered desirable in 1977:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ic1JuZfgU3g
Maybe, but Edwardes was the man who implemented it. In the BL 1971 Policy Document for AEC and Southall in my possession all manner of different scenarios were discussed which are totally contrary to many of the assumptions on this thread. Some were implemented, some were not implemented. I will post relevant extracts from the document when I have time. the person who gave me this, at the time, confidential document is now dead. The document is quite lengthy.
gingerfold:
[zb]
anorak:
The separation of the constituent parts of British Leyland was already considered desirable in 1977:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ic1JuZfgU3gMaybe, but Edwardes was the man who implemented it. In the BL 1971 Policy Document for AEC and Southall in my possession all manner of different scenarios were discussed which are totally contrary to many of the assumptions on this thread. Some were implemented, some were not implemented. I will post relevant extracts from the document when I have time. the person who gave me this, at the time, confidential document is now dead. The document is quite lengthy.
That sounds like the definition of fiddle while Rome burns.Which was all obviously moot from the point when RM bus production was halted,the AEC V8 and Leyland 500 engines were considered a better bet than a wholesale move to Rolls and ■■■■■■■ power,let alone the dumb idea of let’s replace the Triumph 2.5 and Rover P6 with SD1 being followed by the even dumber one of let’s replace them all with the Jap based fwd Acclaim and 800.That’ll fix it.That type of stupid can only be put down to deliberate sabotage.
Carryfast:
That sounds like the definition of fiddle while Rome burns.Which was all obviously moot from the point when RM bus production was halted,the AEC V8 and Leyland 500 engines were considered a better bet than a wholesale move to Rolls and ■■■■■■■ power,let alone the dumb idea of let’s replace the Triumph 2.5 and Rover P6 with SD1 being followed by the even dumber one of let’s replace them all with the Jap based fwd Acclaim and 800.That’ll fix it.That type of stupid can only be put down to deliberate sabotage.
By 1977, when the interview was recorded, the RM had long since been replaced, by more modern buses. The V8 was canned 6 years previously, the 500 had had most of its troubles cured, or at least reduced, ■■■■■■■■ Rolls and Gardner engines were all available in Guy chassis.
All of the cars you cite were replaced at the end of their ordinary market lives. All of their replacements sold well, and remained in production for a lengthy period.
How is any of the above sabotage?
[zb]
anorak:Carryfast:
That sounds like the definition of fiddle while Rome burns.Which was all obviously moot from the point when RM bus production was halted,the AEC V8 and Leyland 500 engines were considered a better bet than a wholesale move to Rolls and ■■■■■■■ power,let alone the dumb idea of let’s replace the Triumph 2.5 and Rover P6 with SD1 being followed by the even dumber one of let’s replace them all with the Jap based fwd Acclaim and 800.That’ll fix it.That type of stupid can only be put down to deliberate sabotage.By 1977, when the interview was recorded, the RM had long since been replaced, by more modern buses. The V8 was canned 6 years previously, the 500 had had most of its troubles cured, or at least reduced, ■■■■■■■■ Rolls and Gardner engines were all available in Guy chassis.
All of the cars you cite were replaced at the end of their ordinary market lives. All of their replacements sold well, and remained in production for a lengthy period.
How is any of the above sabotage?
What was being said there in 1977 obviously all made moot by what had actually happened,what was happening and what was about to happen.IE the damage had already been done and was being added to.
As for sabotage.The facts,that LT was still using the RT in the late 1970’s for want of sufficient RM’s and the predictable incompetence of the RM’s replacements.The cash blown in the development of and warranty costs caused by the AEC V8 and Leyland 500.Also the fact that SD1,let alone Acclaim and 800,were never going to be worthy successors to the 2.5 and P6.Followed by the inevitable exodus of BL’s cutomer base and its market position equally predictably taken over by the foreign competition.All proves it.
Makes me sick when I read all of this and what could have been,If we blame the work force it must be remember if I am right then in the 70s just over a third of SINGLE MANS wage went in stoppages so they could not be blamed for wanting a cleaner better job else where.Bad management and the government were the main reason.The same thing went on in aircraft industry ,BAC Lightning the government ask for missiles no guns,then change to we want guns they changed they asked for changes so the company do not know if they want s… shave or a hair cut 
While the RM and RML were no longer in production after 1968 it would be wrong to claim that it was replaced by more modern designs. Reality is that it saw these more modern designs come…and go. All of the following including single deckers were heralded as replacements for the Routemaster and all of them were withdrawn before it :The Atlantean, The Fleetline, The Merlin,The Swift,The Leyland National, The Scania Metropolitan, TheTitan, The Metrobus and the Leyland Olympian. By 1980 LT was buying back RMLs from London Country and in 2000 it was buying RMLs from wherever it could get them including some which were in preservation.
The last RMLs were withdrawn in December 2005, just failing by a few months to outlive the last of the Volvo Olympians.
fuse:
The same thing went on in aircraft industry ,BAC Lightning the government ask for missiles no guns,then change to we want guns they changed they asked for changes so the company do not know if they want s… shave or a hair cut
The Lightning was still considered to be a strategic defence asset at that point so it was just a case of throwing some cash at the problem with the ADEN Guns being the result and simple solution from early on.I think that one can be put down to ■■■■ up listening to stupid military strategists who said that dog fighting with guns was obsolete just as they also said in the US in the case of the Phantom,so not conspiracy.
However it the fate of Vickers Aircraft Factory at Weybridge and the effectively breach of a government underwritten contract in the National Airline dropping VC10 orders in favour of Boeing 707,arguably was.With the VC10 clearly being the superior aircraft let alone Brit jobs depending on it.With my father having already decided to walk away from his job at the place at that time as a lost cause.Luckily for the family home and finances.
cav551:
While the RM and RML were no longer in production after 1968 it would be wrong to claim that it was replaced by more modern designs. Reality is that it saw these more modern designs come…and go. All of the following including single deckers were heralded as replacements for the Routemaster and all of them were withdrawn before it :The Atlantean, The Fleetline, The Merlin,The Swift,The Leyland National, The Scania Metropolitan, TheTitan, The Metrobus and the Leyland Olympian. By 1980 LT was buying back RMLs from London Country and in 2000 it was buying RMLs from wherever it could get them including some which were in preservation.The last RMLs were withdrawn in December 2005, just failing by a few months to outlive the last of the Volvo Olympians.
Of course, the quality of the engineering of the RM was special. The reconditioning bays in the garages, designed for the purpose, I would guess, were instrumental in its exceptional service life.
Do you think another AEC/LT collaboration would have delivered a superior one-man-operation bus, IE superior to the intended RM replacements- the Fleetline and the Atlantean?
cav551:
By 1980 LT was buying back RMLs from London Country and in 2000 it was buying RMLs from wherever it could get them including some which were in preservation.
LT obviously knew something that others didn’t ( want to ) know and vindication of most of what Parvitt had said. 
On that note was there any documented resistance from any interested Party AEC or LT regarding the ending of RM production at the time ?.If so the reasoning for it might make ‘interesting’ reading.If not maybe providing some credence to the idea of ■■■■ up not conspiracy.
[zb]
anorak:
Do you think another AEC/LT collaboration would have delivered a superior one-man-operation bus, IE superior to the intended RM replacements- the Fleetline and the Atlantean?
The fact that it was of conventional front engine design and the advantages of two man operation were actually an essential part of what made it superior.At least in the eyes of everyone involved at the front line of its usage from its maintenance staff to passengers,with the exception of disabled access provision.I can certainly confirm the retrograde nature of both the Swift and DMS and even the modern types in service in that regard.As opposed to the leap in passenger acceptance levels from RT to RM shown firstly when using 281 v 65/71 and then the change to RM on 65 and the Green Line RMC/L types v DMS and Swift on 281 and 285 respectively.
[zb]
anorak:cav551:
While the RM and RML were no longer in production after 1968 it would be wrong to claim that it was replaced by more modern designs. Reality is that it saw these more modern designs come…and go. All of the following including single deckers were heralded as replacements for the Routemaster and all of them were withdrawn before it :The Atlantean, The Fleetline, The Merlin,The Swift,The Leyland National, The Scania Metropolitan, TheTitan, The Metrobus and the Leyland Olympian. By 1980 LT was buying back RMLs from London Country and in 2000 it was buying RMLs from wherever it could get them including some which were in preservation.The last RMLs were withdrawn in December 2005, just failing by a few months to outlive the last of the Volvo Olympians.
Of course, the quality of the engineering of the RM was special. The reconditioning bays in the garages, designed for the purpose, I would guess, were instrumental in its exceptional service life.
Do you think another AEC/LT collaboration would have delivered a superior one-man-operation bus, IE superior to the intended RM replacements- the Fleetline and the Atlantean?
They. already had a rear engined RM but BL stopped it in favour of the aforementioned products they were producing .I’m only guessing here but would have thought the rear engined RM would have fit in seamlessly with the Aldenham works
AEC Product Policy Document.
This is the discussion paper prepared in May 1971 and I will reproduce it verbatim over the next few days. It runs to 11 pages in total. I hope that it will result in some rational discussion, and of course with the gift of hindsight we all know what happened after this paper was compiled. so, here goes: -
GM AEC / Product Planning May 1971: - BRITISH LEYLAND TRUCK AND BUS DIVISION LIMITED
AEC PRODUCT POLICY
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
BACKGROUND
Until recently AEC have always had a full order book. This having created long delivery periods has led AEC to be somewhat complacent about their development effort.
New projects, such as the V8, have been initiated but they have failed to bring them to fruition. Lack of back-up projects has left the company in a most vulnerable position.
The potential capacity of the plant is 215 vehicles per week (with minimal capital expenditure), split 145/70 BU/KD. However, the present production is 165 vehicles per week, split 120/45. Last year AEC produced 24% of the Division’s premium vehicle output.
Recent events, owing to circumstances partially beyond the control of AEC, will result in AEC under-running their production capacity. These are: -
Introduction of the Leyland National Bus - Effect on AEC
Production of rear engine AEC buses (Swift and Merlin) to stop, except for future specific contracts. Loss of vehicles = 640 (1970 volume).
Introduction of Power to Weight Ratio Legislation - Effect on AEC
The Mercury tractor will have to be downplated to 24 tons as the 505 engine will not develop more than 144 bhp (net installed) in its present form. The vehicle is heavy and expensive at 24 tons, as a result sales will virtually cease. Loss of vehicles - 899 (1970 volume).
Guy to Concentrate on Maximum Capacity Tractor Production - Effect on AEC
Loss of 505 engine sales to Guy. 1,050 engines (1970)
The ■■■■■■■■■■ effect at AEC will be a loss of approximately 1,500 chassis per annum (a loss of 25% of the total chassis production and a reduction in 505 engine production by approximately 1,950 units per annum. (A loss of 50% of 505 engine production).
ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION
These alternatives must be evaluated on Divisional effect - in particular optimizing profit and total production volume, the alternatives are: -
…to be continued
Some questions Graham , wasn’t the V8 shelved before 1971 and wasn’t the Mercury the best selling 16 tonner for a while. I think you mentioned before that AEC had turbocharged the 505 could this have been a direct response to the report?
ramone:
Some questions Graham , wasn’t the V8 shelved before 1971 and wasn’t the Mercury the best selling 16 tonner for a while. I think you mentioned before that AEC had turbocharged the 505 could this have been a direct response to the report?
Morning Paul, you will read later in the document that none of the 7 recommendations were implemented. The Mercury was the best selling 16 ton gvw rigid, and the 505 was a relatively new engine design. (Introduced in 1965). The reason for wanting to ditch the Mercury tractive unit, which sold in worthwhile numbers, was to push the headless wonder 500 series engine in a Lynx tractor unit. Development work was started on a turbo-charged 505, which became the 506 in normally aspirated format. No turbo-charged 505s were sold into service. The reference to the V8 is interesting in that by 1971 AEC thought they had produced a reliable and saleable version. What is also significant is that this document refers to a new premium tractor unit, FPT70, but no mention at all about development of the TL12 engine.
Interesting that Leyland were so concerned that the Mercury unit would have to be downplated to 24 tons. I can agree that the increase in 1972 for 3 axle rigids to 24 from 22 tons did suddenly make it seem less attractive. Most operators would have run it habitually at 24 tons anyway surely. Jack Henley did occasionally run a 33ft tandem or longer but usually with hops. Bewick’s single tyred tandems would have been the only way of getting a really decent payload out of the extra axle required. What I can’t remember is whether the four in line allowed 25tons GVW. I thought the Lynx was a 26ton unit so exactly the same paylod issue applied to it as to the Mercury.The AV 505 is listed in the manual as weighing just over 12 cwt or 619 kg is there any corresponding data for the Leyland 500?
The largest fleet I recall at the time with Mercury units was British Vita/ Blue Dart.