Why did British Leyland fail?

gingerfold:
New projects, such as the V8, have been initiated but they have failed to bring them to fruition. Lack of back-up projects has left the company in a most vulnerable position.

  1. Introduction of the Leyland National Bus - Effect on AEC
    Production of rear engine AEC buses (Swift and Merlin) to stop, except for future specific contracts. Loss of vehicles = 640 (1970 volume).

Firstly it’s not hindsight to say that the V8 was an obvious liability and lemon from the point of it’s first trials in service.

While the bus comment is apt in that non one seems to have said exactly where was/is the case for stopping RM production and not twisting LT’s arm to get it restarted bearing in mind that these people were being paid to have foresight.

cav551:
Interesting that Leyland were so concerned that the Mercury unit would have to be downplated to 24 tons. I can agree that the increase in 1972 for 3 axle rigids to 24 from 22 tons did suddenly make it seem less attractive. Most operators would have run it habitually at 24 tons anyway surely. Jack Henley did occasionally run a 33ft tandem or longer but usually with hops. Bewick’s single tyred tandems would have been the only way of getting a really decent payload out of the extra axle required. What I can’t remember is whether the four in line allowed 25tons GVW. I thought the Lynx was a 26ton unit so exactly the same paylod issue applied to it as to the Mercury.The AV 505 is listed in the manual as weighing just over 12 cwt or 619 kg is there any corresponding data for the Leyland 500?

The largest fleet I recall at the time with Mercury units was British Vita/ Blue Dart.

My uncle had two Mercury tractor units, a 1967 ‘E’ plated at 25 tons gross, that had a four-in-line as its usual trailer, and legally it was 24 tons gvw. The second unit was a 1969 ‘H’ plated at 26 tons gross, and that had a Pitt Tandem Four trailer, identical to Bewick’s. with single wheels. The entire outfit tared at 6 tons 19 cwt 2 qtrs. giving a legal 19 tons payload (when a 32 tonner might give 21.5 tons). To claim that the Mercury tractor unit was heavy was nonsense.

gingerfold:
The Mercury was the best selling 16 ton gvw rigid, and the 505 was a relatively new engine design. (Introduced in 1965). The reason for wanting to ditch the Mercury tractive unit, which sold in worthwhile numbers, was to push the headless wonder 500 series engine in a Lynx tractor unit. What is also significant is that this document refers to a new premium tractor unit, FPT70, but no mention at all about development of the TL12 engine.

Like the deliberate crippling of RM production in the face of its clear superiority possibly more credible evidence of conspiracy/sabotage not ■■■■ up ?.

gingerfold:
To claim that the Mercury tractor unit was heavy was nonsense.

Notwithstanding the use of Rolls ■■■■■■■ the reference to the TL12 was damning.If they really wanted an all in house T45 then a stroked TL13 was the way to do it.

Leyland management it seems would produce any amount of so called facts and figures to try and show that the ‘little brother’ companies were a drain on finances and productivity and needed tweaking, or in reality getting rid of any competition to their own range and ensuring that Leyland was the only premier products in the ‘family’, they did the same with GUY who had full order books with the Big J, but in its latter years (although it was dated by then) restricting the Big J to 30.5 Ton gcw by fitting only the Gardner 180 so as not to compete with the 32 Ton units in the group, it followed the same sort of thinning out as had happened with AEC. Franky.

Frankydobo:
Leyland management it seems would produce any amount of so called facts and figures to try and show that the ‘little brother’ companies were a drain on finances and productivity and needed tweaking, or in reality getting rid of any competition to their own range and ensuring that Leyland was the only premier products in the ‘family’, they did the same with GUY who had full order books with the Big J, but in its latter years (although it was dated by then) restricting the Big J to 30.5 Ton gcw by fitting only the Gardner 180 so as not to compete with the 32 Ton units in the group, it followed the same sort of thinning out as had happened with AEC. Franky.

Like Rover v Triumph by definition there can’t possibly be ‘competition’ between members/divisions of a ‘Group’.IE an AEC sale was as good as a Leyland sale from the point of view of ‘the Group’.I think we’ve actually got some credible evidence of a deliberate plan of hidden rundown and deliberate alienation of the core customer base.There has to be a point where we call conspiracy not ■■■■ up.

Why indeed? The entire British automotive followed the same path in the antipodes.
From the point of view from an irreverent colonial, you lot were sending us rubbish.
The inter and post war years favoured Commonwealth and particularly British imports, by way of tariffs.
The importation of bodiless chassis, for the fitting of local bodies saved more money.
Australia developed a manufacturing and engineering base, second to none, during the war years, to counter the unreliability and shortage of shipping during the conflict.
Trucks
Our transport industry differed greatly from yours. Road transport was born in the post war years. Very few roads were sealed or even surveyed, There were hundreds of miles of earth track with a total lack bridges or facilities. The little passenger transport was done by costal shipping or rail.
Melbourne to Sydney is 880km, Sydney to Brisbane 950km, Brisbane to Cairns 1700km, Melbourne to Adelaide 750km. 300-400 km a day was a big effort in the days before log books and the Leylands, AECs, Thornycrofts et al gave sterling service, Albion was held in particularly high regard.
Fast forward ten years and interstate transport had boomed, the roads in the main had improved with some having rudimentary seal. Everything had advanced except the vehicles. We were still stuck with trucks designed in and built for your conditions, not ours. The arrogance of the manufacturers was, if it’s good enough for us, it’s good enough for you. The tariffs ensured the Poms had no competition. The vast majority of the interstate transport task was performed by owner drivers.
In the early 60s Ed Cameron imported a Kenworth and Anthill Ranger brought in some Macks.
It was soon apparent to the rest of the industry that the extra tariff was soon recouped by the increased productivity of the American products.
British trucks disappeared largely from the interstate corridors through the sixties, they lingered on lighter duties, local and primary producers for another ten years. The last customers were the tight-arsed cockies buying Boxers and Mastiffs at fire sale prices.
The exception was Atkinson who listened and engineered their product to what the customer wanted. We got a sleeper or day cab to suit tropical conditions, with a custom build offering ■■■■■■■■ Detroit two stroke, Road Ranger, Spicer, Rockwell, Eaton even Kirstall, in any combination desired, within engineering limitations. The Atkinson name was the premium brand of International until they were swallowed up by Iveco.
White, Kenworth, Atkinson and Mack were our premium trucks.

Busses
Until the demise of Leyland, they had the bus chassis market pretty much ■■■■■■■, with Bedford doing the same in the lighter end. Leyland and AEC were very highly regarded in this sector. Brisbane City Council operated the biggest fleet of Leyland Panthers in the world.

Cars
Again, the manufacturers told us what we needed and sent us flimsy rubbish that couldn’t cope with our rough, unsealed roads. We were making bodies to fit onto imported chassis.
Post war, the Federal government was keen to maintain the excellent manufacturing industry that had evolved during the hostilities, by way of subsidising the birth of a true Australian car. I won’t go into the politics of it, but General Motors was chosen. A rejected Chevrolet design became the first Holden, released in 1948. Holden were the number one seller for over ten years after it first went on sale.
Most British marques were assembled or manufactured here, with local content increasing annually. Virtually every model had to be engineered and strengthened to suit Australian conditions.
GM-Holden were knocking out Vauxhall Victors and later HA Vivas. The HB was renamed Torana with one version, hotted up and called the Brabham 70, then the accomplishments exported back to the UK. Toranas ultimately were offered with 6 and 8 cylinder engines.
Ford offered most of the models available on the home market, with some unique to us, such as the E93A, known to us as EO3A available as a ute (pick up to you lot) and the sedan with a solid steel roof.
We made the Three Graces until 1960 when we started to assemble the American Falcon. It got off to a bad start, with its habit of punching the McPherson struts through the bonnet. It became popular and reliable car after Australianization. It outlasted th American version becoming a totally Australian design that enjoyed its turn as Australia’s number one seller.
We made Cortinas Mk 1 to Mk V, we stuffed a 4.1 litre six cylinder motor into the last three versions.
We never got the Corsair or Classic/Capri.
Rootes gave us Hillman and Humber.
BMC/Leyland were well represented with a full Australian operation. In the late 50s/early 60s we had a couple of uniquely Australian models, albeit pretty much parts bin specials, but far more suitable to this country than the English models. Google Austin Freeway and Morris Major.
We got Minis, 1100/1300 and 1800 Marks ĺ and ll, these cars were so good they required virtually no re-engineering. Google Morris Nomad.
We did re-engineer the Moke, galvanizing the tub, fitting 13" wheels and a bigger motor, then successfully exporting it to various parts.
Interesting Australian developments were Austin Tasman, Austin Kimberley, P76 and Force 7.
If it hadn’t been for Leyland in the UK pillaging every cent from the Australian division, their fortunes could have been entirely different.

We operated 2 AEC Mercury rigids & 4 Mercury Tractor units. Although all our rigids Mostly Bedford with several Seddon Ford Dodge were 11-13 to GVW the AECs were competitive in operating costs.
We didn’t carry weight so we could use 20 ton plus GVW Tractor units and had a lot of Ford D series which we found better than the on TK tractor we operated along with ‘Leyland’ Mastiff 2 Dodge (2 other failures) and several TMs. One of our customers specified an AEC Mercury & it was in a different class getting 12 MPG against 9-10 with all others WE therefore bought another 3. About 1976-77 we went to order 4 more new Mercuries and were told they could give no delivery date but located a new Leyland Super Comet in stock which was similar spec to the Mercury & we ordered 3 Lynx which were 2-3 months delivery, which we told we’d find so much superior than the aging Mercury design.
In fairness the Comet was OK but not quite as good as the Mercuries. Then come the Lynx. The first went on the road and sadly when it was too late to cancel the next two the troubles started at about 10 weeks old. Gearbox problems which they said they were looking for the solution but asked could we please try to run it on level roads & avoid hills to stop oil running out. Eventually the gearbox packed in & it was off the road for a couple of months waiting for a new gearbox. Of course they had the wonderful fixed head engines and almost weekly our fleet engineer had conversations with his counterpart at Vaux Breweries Sunderland who also had several, while the speculated what would go wrong next.
We had been so impressed by the Mercuries we contacted Ken Marsden of Marsden Coachbuilders Warrington to get a quote to build a pantechnicon on new AEC coach chassis as an alternative to the Seddon passenger chassis we were using at the time or the Bedfords which we had a lot. Marsden’s came back that it would not be a viable one off project for them & suggested we kept to Bedfords. Obviously he must have got some inside knowledge that AEC production was stopping.
In my opinion Leyland was jealous of AEC as they knew they were producing superior vehicles that they could not match

Leyland Super Comet.jpg

SPT.jpg

AEC.jpg

Carryfast:

gingerfold:
New projects, such as the V8, have been initiated but they have failed to bring them to fruition. Lack of back-up projects has left the company in a most vulnerable position.

  1. Introduction of the Leyland National Bus - Effect on AEC
    Production of rear engine AEC buses (Swift and Merlin) to stop, except for future specific contracts. Loss of vehicles = 640 (1970 volume).

Firstly it’s not hindsight to say that the V8 was an obvious liability and lemon from the point of it’s first trials in service.

While the bus comment is apt in that non one seems to have said exactly where was/is the case for stopping RM production and not twisting LT’s arm to get it restarted bearing in mind that these people were being paid to have foresight.

It must be said that LT was a pigheaded organisation which made some remarkably stupid decisions in its reorganisation of routes in the years which preceded and followed the end of RM production, it managed to alienate just about everyone with whom it had dealings: staff, unions, politicians and passengers.It seemed never to be able to make up its mind what it did want, which is well illustrated by the stop-go nature of its attitude to the RM. Brainless would be one description of its decision to send some 100 RMs either to the Barnsley scrapyards or to scrap them itself; a fair number of which had either just been overhauled or repainted. However LT wasn’t ordering front engined bus chassis because by 1968/69 none of the manufacturers was producing them any longer. They weren’t making them because no one was ordering them. The Leyland Atlantean had revolutionised the bus industry by making one man operation a practicable proposition. LT wasn’t ordering more RMLs also because it had received a lot of negative publicity within the bus industry about even ordering the first of the RMs. It had always been concerned with its image, wanting to be seen as providing the Capital with up to date equipment. The fact that it was unable to do so and was forced to keep Routemasters on the streets for almost another four decades is to do with the poor reliability of the newer products, its own structure and the fact that conductor operation -even on front entrance buses, speeded up the service. It was constrained by the inability pay for, recruit and retain the staff to double man the number of vehicles it ran. The poor service which resulted caused passenger numbers to decline to the point where LT found later it had too many buses. Over the following years while the Routemaster was still in service, London was to purchase some 6000 double deck chassis. If instead of being cancelled the FRM had gone into production then at least a significant proportion of that number would likely have gone to AEC/ Park Royal; enough to maintain the viability of that division of BL. If the follow-up XRM project had got beyond the drawing board then just like TSR2, who knows what might have happened?

The next installment…

EVALUATION OF THE ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION

  1. Closure of AEC Plant Now

To avoid industrial relations problems a years’ notice of closure would have to be given. If AEC are not to suffer from the reduction in volume, with its consequent losses (see 2 below), this must take place before the major volume is lost, i.e. it must close early 1972.

The effect of this would be to lose a substantial production volume in the Division unless another company could make up the extra volume with similar vehicles. The only plant with a similar model range to AEC is Leyland Motors.

Despite continual efforts and a full order book Leyland Motors have not been able to make any significant increases in production volume; in fact there has been a 2% reduction in Leyland chassis production between 1968 and 1970. (Actual average weekly volumes 191 and 187).

It is unreasonable, on the above time scale, to expect Leyland Motors to increase their production rate equal to an extra 130 vehicles per week, which represents an increase of 70% over the Leyland production rate. The Division would lose this volume which consists very largely of vehicles in the profitable heavy end of the market.

This lost volume would be picked up by the independents and foreign imports, substantially increasing their strength. It will be difficult for the Division to increase its penetration at their expense in the future when improved models are available.

It can be concluded that the closure of AEC within 12 months will result in a loss of market share plus a loss of revenue and profit to the Division.

This action is not recommended.

  1. Run Down of Production to Meet the New Demand

The loss of 25% of the chassis production would not enable any production departments in the AEC plant to be closed completely. It is considered that unless part of the plant could be closed and disposed of to reduce overheads, the reduced volume could not be made profitably.

Lack of action will lead AEC into a spiraling loss situation and must be avoided.

  1. Increase the Sales of Other AEC Vehicles

The AEC vehicles have been sold in most of the markets for which they are suitable. There are a few opportunities which can be exploited in the short term, e.g. the export market will take some more Rangers, and the home market may take a few more Mandator tractors. The Marshal can be uprated to 24 tons with minimum modification, this should gain some extra sales (approx. 100 per annum). The Mammoth Major 8 can be uprated to 28 tons, with an anticipated minor expansion of the eight wheeler market this model should achieve 100 incremental unit sales per annum.

The total incremental volume of 200 per annum will make little difference to the overall position of the company. Volume taken by the Leyland Lynx and Bison from the Mercury and Marshal will soon erode this small increase.

This action cannot be considered as a satisfactory solution.

  1. Increasing Sales by the Introduction of New and / or Improved AEC Models

In the short term the only new models which might give substantially increased sales volumes are the V8 models, which may be re-introduced in September 1971, with some modifications to the existing specification.

However, only a marginal increase in sales can be expected from vehicles fitted with this engine in its present condition. This incremental volume will make a small contribution to overhead recovery but will make little difference to the overall company position.

However, if all other avenues are closed to AEC, a crash development programme will have to be embarked upon to increase the competitiveness of the present vehicles. This would include: -
A. Adoption of the 5.5" lift cab and extended front panel (where applicable). This would result in improved cooling, improved reliability, and thus improved sales.
B. Development of the 505 and 760 engines in both naturally aspirated and turbo-charged forms to give increased power, better fuel consumption etc.
C. Development of the Swift bus chassis and continued sales efforts in all markets.
D. Development of new easy-build cab to accept the V8 and 760 for Southern Hemisphere markets.
E. Development of the V8, principally to improve durability.
F. Development of the Sabre coach chassis, possibly fitting proprietary V8 engines as options.

The successful conclusion of the above developments would enable the sales of AEC vehicles to be maintained despite the increased competitiveness of other Divisional models and competitive vehicles.

However the development of the 505 and 760 engines, the Swift and the easy-build cab are directly opposed to Divisional policy and would slow the increase in the 500 Series vehicles’ sales quite appreciably, depress sales of the Leyland National, and of the proposed FPT70 premium heavy goods range.

If no other models are available to AEC these developments must take place to keep the plant profitable.

Owing to adverse effects on other Divisional models this cannot be considered to be a satisfactory solution.

…to be continued

Referring to the post immediately above:

  1. I wonder if the “easy build” cab was what AEC was doing with the American-looking 6x4 prototype?
  2. It mentions the 5.5" raised cab, along with an “extended front panel”. That panel would be the one which appeared on the facelifted Leylands (Buffalo, Lynx, Bison), around 1973, I guess. Room for more radiator, to help the V8…

gingerfold:
However the development of the 505 and 760 engines, the Swift and the easy-build cab are directly opposed to Divisional policy and would slow the increase in the 500 Series vehicles’ sales quite appreciably, depress sales of the Leyland National, and of the proposed FPT70 premium heavy goods range.

If no other models are available to AEC these developments must take place to keep the plant profitable.

Owing to adverse effects on other Divisional models this cannot be considered to be a satisfactory solution.

Let’s get this right.The Swift is a universally hated cattle truck.Let’s throw more cash at it.

The 500 engine is a too small capacity over stressed dodgy designed piece of junk great more cash thrown at it will fix that.

The RM is a universally liked bus but no one wants it.But LT is still happily using the RT and will be until almost the end of this decade.

We don’t have the foresight to see that the T45 is going to be the Group’s standard heavy product regardless of AEC,Scammell,or Leyland input.So let’s not make a stroked TL13 that will sit between Rolls and 14 litre ■■■■■■■ with the best advantages of both that will be ready to put in it.How much were these people being paid to wreck the firm. :open_mouth:

cav551:
It must be said that LT was a pigheaded organisation which made some remarkably stupid decisions in its reorganisation of routes in the years which preceded and followed the end of RM production, it managed to alienate just about everyone with whom it had dealings: staff, unions, politicians and passengers.It seemed never to be able to make up its mind what it did want, which is well illustrated by the stop-go nature of its attitude to the RM. Brainless would be one description of its decision to send some 100 RMs either to the Barnsley scrapyards or to scrap them itself; a fair number of which had either just been overhauled or repainted. However LT wasn’t ordering front engined bus chassis because by 1968/69 none of the manufacturers was producing them any longer. They weren’t making them because no one was ordering them. The Leyland Atlantean had revolutionised the bus industry by making one man operation a practicable proposition. LT wasn’t ordering more RMLs also because it had received a lot of negative publicity within the bus industry about even ordering the first of the RMs. It had always been concerned with its image, wanting to be seen as providing the Capital with up to date equipment. The fact that it was unable to do so and was forced to keep Routemasters on the streets for almost another four decades is to do with the poor reliability of the newer products, its own structure and the fact that conductor operation -even on front entrance buses, speeded up the service. It was constrained by the inability pay for, recruit and retain the staff to double man the number of vehicles it ran. The poor service which resulted caused passenger numbers to decline to the point where LT found later it had too many buses. Over the following years while the Routemaster was still in service, London was to purchase some 6000 double deck chassis. If instead of being cancelled the FRM had gone into production then at least a significant proportion of that number would likely have gone to AEC/ Park Royal; enough to maintain the viability of that division of BL. If the follow-up XRM project had got beyond the drawing board then just like TSR2, who knows what might have happened?

Firstly we’ve got an unexplained catch 22 chicken and egg situation regarding LT supposedly no longer ordering the RM because AEC supposedly was no longer building it and vice versa.

When no one is obviously going to be stupid enough to stop making something that there is still a demand for and we know that there was a demand for the RM,by LT,into the 21st century let alone up to 1980.To the point where the RT was still in service with LT/LC throughout most of the 1970’s.We really need to see some more information regarding the ending of production of the RM who actually took that decision and why and is there any documented evidence showing that LT actually led that decision as opposed to AEC’s management.While just like most of the other events related to other parts of the group we’ve obviously got BL’s management lying about the ongoing demand for its proven products as opposed to customer resistance to their invariably ( deliberately ? ) retrograde replacements.That obviously applied to everything from cars like Triumph 2.5/Rover P6 to RM buses.

…continuing with the next instalment…

Increase Sales by the Manufacture of New Divisional Models at AEC

AEC production, like Leyland’s, is carried out on quite a small scale. The product line-up consists of 5 medium trucks, 6 heavy trucks, 4 passenger vehicles and 3 engines for a 1970 production of 131 vehicles per week. Greater specialization in manufacture is necessary to increase the manufacturing efficiency.

Proposals are in hand for a number of new model ranges. The first of these proposals is the high cab heavy duty model FPT70, which has a target introduction for end of 1973.

The FPT70 range is ideally suited to production at AEC because: -

  1. The proposed model range will use ‘bought in’ engines, gearboxes, and axles. The present AEC heavy goods vehicles use gearboxes and axles from external Divisional sources. Apart from stopping engine production (see below) there will be no great change required to the AEC production facilities.

  2. The FPT70 model range will be a maximum capacity range suitable for operation in the UK, European, and Southern Hemisphere markets. It substitutes for the bulk of the present AEC heavy goods range in terms of specification and principal markets in which they are sold.

The advantages of production at AEC are: -
a) It is the plant which is closest to Europe.
b) It is close to the largest UK docks at London and European ferries at Dover, Harwich, and Southampton. This enables exports to Europe to be carried directly by truck, or in the case of labour problems in the London docks, exports to other parts of the world can be carried by truck for shipment from European ports.
c) it is close to the UK truck sales “centre of gravity”.
d) Press capacity is at a reasonable distance for transportation (PSF at Cowley and Swindon are 55 and 80 miles respectively) for the cab.
e) It has a long straight shop well suited to the manufacture of this type of vehicle. (At present this shop is partially occupied by a static assembly line).

This project, as it uses proprietary engines, would enable production of engines to stop completely and the engine plant could be disposed of. The 760 engine is not powerful enough for maximum capacity 4 and 6 wheeled tractors and if V8 production is to continue it should be transferred to Leyland. The decision of the future of the V8 will be made following the engineering studies that are now being carried out.

AEC could then concentrate on vehicle assembly.

It is suggested that AEC should build the proposed FPT70 range from its introduction in 1973 at least until 1975 to replace the present obsolescent AEC and Leyland heavy goods forward control ranges.

The sales of this range are expected to rise from around 20 per week in 1974 to between 75 and 110 per week - depending on Britain’s entry to the Common Market in the late 1970s.

The adoption of vehicle assembly operations at AEC does mean that should the Division centralize its assembly operations at another location the volume can easily be transferred from AEC and then Southall can be closed if necessary.

This proposal does not cover the medium weight AEC range and does not alleviate the short term problems.

gingerfold:
…continuing with the next instalment…

Increase Sales by the Manufacture of New Divisional Models at AEC

AEC production, like Leyland’s, is carried out on quite a small scale. The product line-up consists of 5 medium trucks, 6 heavy trucks, 4 passenger vehicles and 3 engines for a 1970 production of 131 vehicles per week. Greater specialization in manufacture is necessary to increase the manufacturing efficiency.

Proposals are in hand for a number of new model ranges. The first of these proposals is the high cab heavy duty model FPT70, which has a target introduction for end of 1973.

The FPT70 range is ideally suited to production at AEC because: -

  1. The proposed model range will use ‘bought in’ engines, gearboxes, and axles. The present AEC heavy goods vehicles use gearboxes and axles from external Divisional sources. Apart from stopping engine production (see below) there will be no great change required to the AEC production facilities.

  2. The FPT70 model range will be a maximum capacity range suitable for operation in the UK, European, and Southern Hemisphere markets. It substitutes for the bulk of the present AEC heavy goods range in terms of specification and principal markets in which they are sold.

The advantages of production at AEC are: -
a) It is the plant which is closest to Europe.
b) It is close to the largest UK docks at London and European ferries at Dover, Harwich, and Southampton. This enables exports to Europe to be carried directly by truck, or in the case of labour problems in the London docks, exports to other parts of the world can be carried by truck for shipment from European ports.
c) it is close to the UK truck sales “centre of gravity”.
d) Press capacity is at a reasonable distance for transportation (PSF at Cowley and Swindon are 55 and 80 miles respectively) for the cab.
e) It has a long straight shop well suited to the manufacture of this type of vehicle. (At present this shop is partially occupied by a static assembly line).

This project, as it uses proprietary engines, would enable production of engines to stop completely and the engine plant could be disposed of. The 760 engine is not powerful enough for maximum capacity 4 and 6 wheeled tractors and if V8 production is to continue it should be transferred to Leyland. The decision of the future of the V8 will be made following the engineering studies that are now being carried out.

AEC could then concentrate on vehicle assembly.

It is suggested that AEC should build the proposed FPT70 range from its introduction in 1973 at least until 1975 to replace the present obsolescent AEC and Leyland heavy goods forward control ranges.

The sales of this range are expected to rise from around 20 per week in 1974 to between 75 and 110 per week - depending on Britain’s entry to the Common Market in the late 1970s.

The adoption of vehicle assembly operations at AEC does mean that should the Division centralize its assembly operations at another location the volume can easily be transferred from AEC and then Southall can be closed if necessary.

This proposal does not cover the medium weight AEC range and does not alleviate the short term problems.

It sounds like they were hell bent on closure but knew it would be disastrous for the bisiness as a whole , they also recognised the threat of european imports being a major concern .They were throwing all their eggs in one basket with the 500 when the answer to their problems was staring them in the face. They state that the cabs needed raising to help with reliability problems but never implemented it. The last Mandators were vitually identical to the originals but for a few cosmetic differences. Reading the report shows they knew what was needed but wanted it to be done with Leyland products built in Leyland . I reckon the FPT70 would have been the Marathon

ramone:

gingerfold:
…continuing with the next instalment…

Increase Sales by the Manufacture of New Divisional Models at AEC

AEC production, like Leyland’s, is carried out on quite a small scale. The product line-up consists of 5 medium trucks, 6 heavy trucks, 4 passenger vehicles and 3 engines for a 1970 production of 131 vehicles per week. Greater specialization in manufacture is necessary to increase the manufacturing efficiency.

Proposals are in hand for a number of new model ranges. The first of these proposals is the high cab heavy duty model FPT70, which has a target introduction for end of 1973.

The FPT70 range is ideally suited to production at AEC because: -

  1. The proposed model range will use ‘bought in’ engines, gearboxes, and axles. The present AEC heavy goods vehicles use gearboxes and axles from external Divisional sources. Apart from stopping engine production (see below) there will be no great change required to the AEC production facilities.

  2. The FPT70 model range will be a maximum capacity range suitable for operation in the UK, European, and Southern Hemisphere markets. It substitutes for the bulk of the present AEC heavy goods range in terms of specification and principal markets in which they are sold.

The advantages of production at AEC are: -
a) It is the plant which is closest to Europe.
b) It is close to the largest UK docks at London and European ferries at Dover, Harwich, and Southampton. This enables exports to Europe to be carried directly by truck, or in the case of labour problems in the London docks, exports to other parts of the world can be carried by truck for shipment from European ports.
c) it is close to the UK truck sales “centre of gravity”.
d) Press capacity is at a reasonable distance for transportation (PSF at Cowley and Swindon are 55 and 80 miles respectively) for the cab.
e) It has a long straight shop well suited to the manufacture of this type of vehicle. (At present this shop is partially occupied by a static assembly line).

This project, as it uses proprietary engines, would enable production of engines to stop completely and the engine plant could be disposed of. The 760 engine is not powerful enough for maximum capacity 4 and 6 wheeled tractors and if V8 production is to continue it should be transferred to Leyland. The decision of the future of the V8 will be made following the engineering studies that are now being carried out.

AEC could then concentrate on vehicle assembly.

It is suggested that AEC should build the proposed FPT70 range from its introduction in 1973 at least until 1975 to replace the present obsolescent AEC and Leyland heavy goods forward control ranges.

The sales of this range are expected to rise from around 20 per week in 1974 to between 75 and 110 per week - depending on Britain’s entry to the Common Market in the late 1970s.

The adoption of vehicle assembly operations at AEC does mean that should the Division centralize its assembly operations at another location the volume can easily be transferred from AEC and then Southall can be closed if necessary.

This proposal does not cover the medium weight AEC range and does not alleviate the short term problems.

It sounds like they were hell bent on closure but knew it would be disastrous for the bisiness as a whole , they also recognised the threat of european imports being a major concern .They were throwing all their eggs in one basket with the 500 when the answer to their problems was staring them in the face. They state that the cabs needed raising to help with reliability problems but never implemented it. The last Mandators were vitually identical to the originals but for a few cosmetic differences. Reading the report shows they knew what was needed but wanted it to be done with Leyland products built in Leyland . I reckon the FPT70 would have been the Marathon

Yes, it’s safe to assume that the FPT70 was the Marathon because it met the planned launch date of late 1973, But no mention whatsoever of the TL12 engine development that it was launched with, and not the “bought in” engines. But we know that the TL12 was developed within a very short time frame.

Is there any mention either in these or other records about AEC’s or Leyland’s obligation regarding the supply of parts for recently discontinued products? The wet liner engines for example were still being supplied only two or three years previously. From memory it was not unknown for the Mercury rigid to require a main chassis rail renewed, and the Regent V certainly had issues with cracking of the banjo crossmember betweeen the engine and gearbox requiring the part to be replaced. Looking ahead only a matter of three or four years from this report the entire commercial vehicle operating industry was to be plunged into despair over the lack of spare parts availability.

cav551:
Is there any mention either in these or other records about AEC’s or Leyland’s obligation regarding the supply of parts for recently discontinued products? The wet liner engines for example were still being supplied only two or three years previously. From memory it was not unknown for the Mercury rigid to require a main chassis rail renewed, and the Regent V certainly had issues with cracking of the banjo crossmember betweeen the engine and gearbox requiring the part to be replaced. Looking ahead only a matter of three or four years from this report the entire commercial vehicle operating industry was to be plunged into despair over the lack of spare parts availability.

I was thinking about that yesterday and with hindsight someone could have set up a business manufacturing and selling parts to LT for a number of years if BL would have allowed it. There’s a company in Leyland opposite what i’m guessing was the bus plant supplying Gardner parts worldwide.I was speaking to a guy there and he said the business was very busy.

cav551:
Is there any mention either in these or other records about AEC’s or Leyland’s obligation regarding the supply of parts for recently discontinued products? The wet liner engines for example were still being supplied only two or three years previously. From memory it was not unknown for the Mercury rigid to require a main chassis rail renewed, and the Regent V certainly had issues with cracking of the banjo crossmember betweeen the engine and gearbox requiring the part to be replaced. Looking ahead only a matter of three or four years from this report the entire commercial vehicle operating industry was to be plunged into despair over the lack of spare parts availability.

No mention anywhere in the document about spares. The Mercury rigid chassis could crack at the offside front rear spring hanger bracket. When the weight was increased to 16 tons gross and wheelbases lengthened to 18 feet it caught our several manufacturers with chassis flexing and stressing problems. The Mercury rigid was an all-round better lorry than a Super Comet rigid but the Leyland had a stronger chassis.

Spares. An AEC depot manager, who then became a Leyland depot manager, told me that the typical spares inventory at a large depot was huge and it was a very complex situation because of all the various models within the Truck and Bus Division that they had to cater for. The Marathon was the example he used. Another model came into the system, but there were three engine options eventually, so three times the number of engine spares needed even if it was only basic items such as filters. It was frustrating for someone urgently needing spares, but looking at the bigger picture it must have been a massive nightmare for the dealerships.

I get the impression reading the report that the BL management didn’t really have a clue what to do with AEC . Close it , don’t close it , stop building the 505 , build it , improve the models , lets not bother ,it goes on and on with no real structure.They suggested that AEC could be just an assembler when all they really had to do was upgrade what they had. By the time the Marathon was launched they had a cab that could have been lowered enoughfor use on the rigids and some Mandator models The TL12 could have been downrated and fit in the 8 wheelers and some 6 wheelers and like Graham mentioned the 505 could have been turbocharged. They already had the Sabre chassis which they could maybe have fitted the TL12 in and they could have tinkered with the idea of building the rear engined RM for LT