There had been a problem recruiting and retaining engineering and production staff in this geographical area which dated back to the end of WW2. The issues were not just confined to West London, indeed they arose nationally, but it was in this area that they seem to have had the greatest impact. The servicemen returning to civilian life simply were not prepared to go back to the old working conditions and labour relations which had existed pre war. London Transport, the AEC and Park Royal faced the same problem again in the late 1960s and 1970s as they had done in 1946/7. There was better paid, often cleaner work, with better conditions and shift patterns available which attracted both prospective and existing employees. In 1946/7 the AEC couldn’t meet the demand from LT for its Regent III, Park Royal couldn’t meet the demand for bodies either, nor could Weymann of Addlestone. This was one reason why LT had ordered Leyland PD2 chassis, and bodies from Cravens of Anglesey and Saunders of Sheffield along with later additions from Metro Cammell and Leyland to meet its requirement to replace its dilapidated, worn-out fleet. By the time of the Hansard link similar condition existed.
cav551:
There had been a problem recruiting and retaining engineering and production staff in this geographical area which dated back to the end of WW2. The issues were not just confined to West London, indeed they arose nationally, but it was in this area that they seem to have had the greatest impact. The servicemen returning to civilian life simply were not prepared to go back to the old working conditions and labour relations which had existed pre war. London Transport, the AEC and Park Royal faced the same problem again in the late 1960s and 1970s as they had done in 1946/7. There was better paid, often cleaner work, with better conditions and shift patterns available which attracted both prospective and existing employees. In 1946/7 the AEC couldn’t meet the demand from LT for its Regent III, Park Royal couldn’t meet the demand for bodies either, nor could Weymann of Addlestone. This was one reason why LT had ordered Leyland PD2 chassis, and bodies from Cravens of Anglesey and Saunders of Sheffield along with later additions from Metro Cammell and Leyland to meet its requirement to replace its dilapidated, worn-out fleet. By the time of the Hansard link similar condition existed.
So having realising that cav wouldnt it have been more sensible for Leyland to have at least kept production of spares for LT because they couldnt develop anything to surpass the RM . Also one MP moaned that his local area had been waiting for ages for new buses that Leyland couldnt supply . It must have been music to the ears of Volvo who have totally dominated the British double (and single) decker scene since they bought Leyland Bus. On a different comment from the link what was the Leyland Titan like was it any good , wasnt there talk of building it at Southall at one point?
ramone:
cav551:
There had been a problem recruiting and retaining engineering and production staff in this geographical area which dated back to the end of WW2. The issues were not just confined to West London, indeed they arose nationally, but it was in this area that they seem to have had the greatest impact. The servicemen returning to civilian life simply were not prepared to go back to the old working conditions and labour relations which had existed pre war. London Transport, the AEC and Park Royal faced the same problem again in the late 1960s and 1970s as they had done in 1946/7. There was better paid, often cleaner work, with better conditions and shift patterns available which attracted both prospective and existing employees. In 1946/7 the AEC couldn’t meet the demand from LT for its Regent III, Park Royal couldn’t meet the demand for bodies either, nor could Weymann of Addlestone. This was one reason why LT had ordered Leyland PD2 chassis, and bodies from Cravens of Anglesey and Saunders of Sheffield along with later additions from Metro Cammell and Leyland to meet its requirement to replace its dilapidated, worn-out fleet. By the time of the Hansard link similar condition existed.So having realising that cav wouldn
t it have been more sensible for Leyland to have at least kept production of spares for LT because they couldnt develop anything to surpass the RM . Also one MP moaned that his local area had been waiting for ages for new buses that Leyland couldnt supply . It must have been music to the ears of Volvo who have totally dominated the British double (and single) decker scene since they bought Leyland Bus. On a different comment from the link what was the Leyland Titan like was it any good , wasnt there talk of building it at Southall at one point?
I have an internal BL report written in 1972, and given to me years ago, discussing the future viability of Southall after the loss of all its double deck bus production. One reason given for running down production was the difficulty in retaining, and recruiting, skilled workers. The close proximity of Southall to Heathrow was given as one reason. Jobs were plentiful at Heathrow as the demand for air travel increased. A baggage handler at the airport probably earned more than a time-served and skilled fitter at Southall.
Carryfast:
[zb]
anorak:
The Parliament minutes linked by Ramone illuminates this subject well. The politicians participating in the argument obviously know f. all about engineering or manufacturing, other than the basic stuff that anyone would read in the Financial Times. The picture painted is that of the parent company trying to do things smarter, and encountering bog standard resistance to change in its subsidiary. No one trusts/understands the well-educated young engineers from up North, so they down tools, at least to some extent.I can only speculate at the reason for the failure to recruit, to clear the order backlog- perhaps Leyland realised early, that the products would probably have to made elsewhere, starting from a clean sheet, if they were to compete, in the long term, with the forward-thinking Continentals?
Did you actually read it.They didn’t ‘down tools’ they were made redundant as part of a planned run down to closure.While LT soldiered on with it’s reliable simple to maintain proven RT designs.Because some well educated Northerner had decided that it would be a good idea to shut down production of its also equally proven etc replacement in the form of the RM,just when it was needed most.
I have read it. This is what I read:
“…At the root of the contempt is a mythical character called Hurry-up Harry. He is the archetypal Leyland career man who comes down from the Midlands with his well-researched theories and his expertise and runs into distrust from the shop floor every time he opens his mouth…”
I know what I would do, if I found myself in ownership of the assets- strip them, as fast as possible. If I also owned a handful of factories making similar stuff, it would be a no-brainer- just put the tools in the one with the least obstructive shop floor. Given a brief to rationalise, as Michael Edwardes was, how could there be any alternative?
[zb]
anorak:Carryfast:
[zb]
anorak:
The Parliament minutes linked by Ramone illuminates this subject well. The politicians participating in the argument obviously know f. all about engineering or manufacturing, other than the basic stuff that anyone would read in the Financial Times. The picture painted is that of the parent company trying to do things smarter, and encountering bog standard resistance to change in its subsidiary. No one trusts/understands the well-educated young engineers from up North, so they down tools, at least to some extent.I can only speculate at the reason for the failure to recruit, to clear the order backlog- perhaps Leyland realised early, that the products would probably have to made elsewhere, starting from a clean sheet, if they were to compete, in the long term, with the forward-thinking Continentals?
Did you actually read it.They didn’t ‘down tools’ they were made redundant as part of a planned run down to closure.While LT soldiered on with it’s reliable simple to maintain proven RT designs.Because some well educated Northerner had decided that it would be a good idea to shut down production of its also equally proven etc replacement in the form of the RM,just when it was needed most.
I have read it. This is what I read:
“…At the root of the contempt is a mythical character called Hurry-up Harry. He is the archetypal Leyland career man who comes down from the Midlands with his well-researched theories and his expertise and runs into distrust from the shop floor every time he opens his mouth…”
You’ve selectively left out this for some reason.
‘‘I am sick at heart at the closure of the Park Royal factory.It is a factory with which I have had the honour to be associated with since I was first elected to this house 20 years ago’’.‘‘I have watched the Park Royal factory decline with a thriving industrial complex of skilled engineering.Now a wasteland and a desert of empty factory space and warehousing.The factory is one of the last bastions of skilled labour in my area.I used to have a great pride in the fact that I could boast that London buses were made in my area and they were the best in the world.At the centre of this disaster have been years of uncertainty the consequence of which has been a complete demoralisation of the workforce’’.
So tell us why was LT using the RT on numerous routes,including some of the longest like the 65/71 and London Country routes until well into the late 1970’s,when RM production had been stopped in the late 1960’s. 
As for Parvitt’s words they could have applied anywhere from AEC to Scammell to Bedford and my employers let alone Hawker or Vickers aircraft.Zb arrogant Northerners insulting a second to none skilled southern workforce covering every sector from automotive to aviation. 
[zb]
anorak:
The Parliament minutes linked by Ramone illuminates this subject well. The politicians participating in the argument obviously know f. all about engineering or manufacturing, other than the basic stuff that anyone would read in the Financial Times. The picture painted is that of the parent company trying to do things smarter, and encountering bog standard resistance to change in its subsidiary. No one trusts/understands the well-educated young engineers from up North, so they down tools, at least to some extent.I can only speculate at the reason for the failure to recruit, to clear the order backlog- perhaps Leyland realised early, that the products would probably have to made elsewhere, starting from a clean sheet, if they were to compete, in the long term, with the forward-thinking Continentals?
I think that, from the 1970s onwards, Leyland’s senior managers knew what they needed to achieve. They also knew that most of it should have been done earlier, and time was running out. Their approach was ham-fisted and ruthless, possibly because of that. I also think that the Government should have hung on in, until the job was done. Much of the engineering expertise is still working- in Jaguar Land Rover, Leyland Trucks, Leyland Technical Centre plus various consultancies. If it had been kept together, I think more design and manufacturing would have been retained in GB, which would have profited more from a 21st Century BL, than it does from those fragmented foreign-serving subcontractors.
In hindsight it should never have come to this as British Leyland as we knew it should never have been. Surely LT a large customer who had dealt with and worked very closely with AEC should have been treated with a little respect. They had the Aldenham works which must have cost a small fortune to run purely for the upkeep of buses designed and built by AEC . The RM production ceased in 68 but AEC had already built its replacement in the rear engine RM only for Leyland to say no. This is a very questionable decision and the alternatives never sold in London and so the RT and RM lived on . Could it have been another case of the arrogance of Leyland management saying we will build what we want not what you require .I understand your view on centralising production but when they cant service the demand for vehicles the decision to close plants that are producing doesn`t make sense.
Carryfast has made an excellent point about the RM bus which has a significant part to play in this saga. Once again we can lay the blame at political interference and management politics. The AEC, ParkRoyal and London Transport had created a technically advanced, ultimately very reliable, yet simple; and at the time of conception, economically probably the class leading vehicle. Regrettably it simply got overtaken by events some of which were predictable by the time mainstream production commenced.
So why was it not developed?
LT was obliged not just to provide a bus service but to balance its books. As mentioned before in the buses thread, political interference created an almost insolvable problem. LT was in a cleft stick. What were referred to as Platform Staff had become increasingly difficult to recruit and retain. The shift patterns were unattractive, the hours long and/or inconvenient, the pay no longer competitive with other occupations and LT was a comparatively harsh disciplinarian employer. Add these to the stress from traffic congestion and an increasingly less cooperative passenger and one can see why there were difficulties. Immigration from the Carribean which had been almost the mainstay of LT was dwindling rapidly. The various government incomes policies of the time prevented LT from offering pay levels which would compensate. In addition LT was prevented from raising fares to a level which would attract staff, by first political prices policy but also by customer resistance to higher fares. passenger numbers were dwindling. Fewer passenger meant less revenue, meant poor wages, meant staff problems which meant no bus on service which meant disgruntled passengers, which meant fewer passengers, less revenue and an ever revolving not so merry go round.
There was in theory a way out - one man operation which was initially illegal for double deck vehicles. When it was OK it obviously met with Union resistance, this would mean staff cuts: poor management inevitably is met with Union opposition to any move seen as not in its members interest. If there had been management and political will and a long term vision to attract passengers with a better service, then one man operation might have been made to work. It didn’t get a proper chance because LT shot itself in the foot with its meddling in the engineering of the Fleetline and later with the Scania Metropolitan and because it wasn’t allowed to buy the bus it need : the FRM. That aside we lead on to the management politics within Leyland and LT.
The RM was - IS an extremely efficient people mover. One criterion for assessing this is to compare unladen weight with the number of passengers carried. The previous model RT had produced a figure of 296 lb per passenger, the RM 254, The RML reduced this to 235, the Atlantean rose to 275, the Fleetline 277. LT and its partners had developed the FRM, an AEC front entrance, transverse rear engine double decker using a very large percentage of RM components, this in the solitary prototype form gave a figure of 269 while the London spec DM Fleetline was 298. That equates to over a ton of extra unladen weight for the fuel to accelerate… every few hundred yards! To be fair the DMS Fleetline could achieve 251 but Londoners expected a seat and not a cattle truck! On the other hand AEC’s engineers were confident that production FRMs would weigh about 3 cwt less giving 255lbs per passenger.
The FRM had one drawback; it was head and shoulders above the products Leyland had of its own and from Daimler to offer; it was the bus LT staff wanted and needed, its crews, engineering staff and operations department managers all wanted it. Senior management in their ivory towers had ideas of single deck standee cattle trucks. Too embarrassing for Leyland to admit that Southall could so easily eclipse their products, they knew that while the rear platform RM hadn’t sold elsewhere once the provincial operators saw the bus in volume LT service enough would be ordering from AEC… so they killed it off along with AEC’s largest customer for double deck chassis. LT’s senior managers also weren’t prepared to lose face and admit that their plans based on the DMS Fleetline and over-long, single deck, standee buses were the wrong choice.
With the right vehicle LT could have made partial double deck one man operation to work, kept and increased its passengers, improved finances and wages, retrained conductors to drive the additional vehicles required to carry the increased passenger loadings and placated the unions.
Instead the British disease struck; absolutely ■■■■■■■ hopeless, arrogant, pigheaded, blind, cretinous British senior management with its ever- present contempt for its workforce,suppliers and customers.
cav551:
Carryfast has made an excellent point about the RM bus which has a significant part to play in this saga. Once again we can lay the blame at political interference and management politics. The AEC, ParkRoyal and London Transport had created a technically advanced, ultimately very reliable, yet simple; and at the time of conception, economically probably the class leading vehicle. Regrettably it simply got overtaken by events some of which were predictable by the time mainstream production commenced.So why was it not developed?
LT was obliged not just to provide a bus service but to balance its books. As mentioned before in the buses thread, political interference created an almost insolvable problem. LT was in a cleft stick. What were referred to as Platform Staff had become increasingly difficult to recruit and retain. The shift patterns were unattractive, the hours long and/or inconvenient, the pay no longer competitive with other occupations and LT was a comparatively harsh disciplinarian employer. Add these to the stress from traffic congestion and an increasingly less cooperative passenger and one can see why there were difficulties. Immigration from the Carribean which had been almost the mainstay of LT was dwindling rapidly. The various government incomes policies of the time prevented LT from offering pay levels which would compensate. In addition LT was prevented from raising fares to a level which would attract staff, by first political prices policy but also by customer resistance to higher fares. passenger numbers were dwindling. Fewer passenger meant less revenue, meant poor wages, meant staff problems which meant no bus on service which meant disgruntled passengers, which meant fewer passengers, less revenue and an ever revolving not so merry go round.
There was in theory a way out - one man operation which was initially illegal for double deck vehicles. When it was OK it obviously met with Union resistance, this would mean staff cuts: poor management inevitably is met with Union opposition to any move seen as not in its members interest. If there had been management and political will and a long term vision to attract passengers with a better service, then one man operation might have been made to work. It didn’t get a proper chance because LT shot itself in the foot with its meddling in the engineering of the Fleetline and later with the Scania Metropolitan and because it wasn’t allowed to buy the bus it need : the FRM. That aside we lead on to the management politics within Leyland and LT.
The RM was - IS an extremely efficient people mover. One criterion for assessing this is to compare unladen weight with the number of passengers carried. The previous model RT had produced a figure of 296 lb per passenger, the RM 254, The RML reduced this to 235, the Atlantean rose to 275, the Fleetline 277. LT and its partners had developed the FRM, an AEC front entrance, transverse rear engine double decker using a very large percentage of RM components, this in the solitary prototype form gave a figure of 269 while the London spec DM Fleetline was 298. That equates to over a ton of extra unladen weight for the fuel to accelerate… every few hundred yards! To be fair the DMS Fleetline could achieve 251 but Londoners expected a seat and not a cattle truck! On the other hand AEC’s engineers were confident that production FRMs would weigh about 3 cwt less giving 255lbs per passenger.
The FRM had one drawback; it was head and shoulders above the products Leyland had of its own and from Daimler to offer; it was the bus LT staff wanted and needed, its crews, engineering staff and operations department managers all wanted it. Senior management in their ivory towers had ideas of single deck standee cattle trucks. Too embarrassing for Leyland to admit that Southall could so easily eclipse their products, they knew that while the rear platform RM hadn’t sold elsewhere once the provincial operators saw the bus in volume LT service enough would be ordering from AEC… so they killed it off along with AEC’s largest customer for double deck chassis. LT’s senior managers also weren’t prepared to lose face and admit that their plans based on the DMS Fleetline and over-long, single deck, standee buses were the wrong choice.
With the right vehicle LT could have made partial double deck one man operation to work, kept and increased its passengers, improved finances and wages, retrained conductors to drive the additional vehicles required to carry the increased passenger loadings and placated the unions.
Instead the British disease struck; absolutely [zb] hopeless, arrogant, pigheaded, blind, cretinous British senior management with its ever- present contempt for its workforce,suppliers and customers.
It sounds familiar cav , many considered the lorries produced in Southall much superior to their north west built stablemates. The money pumped into BL by the government was staggering albeit most going to the car division the people who knew what they were doing created an out of control monster and tried to rectify it with tax payers money and second rate management add to that MPs who could compete with the lunatics we have now and there you have the answer to Why did British Leyland fail?
Carryfast:
[zb]
anorak:
I have read it. This is what I read:“…At the root of the contempt is a mythical character called Hurry-up Harry. He is the archetypal Leyland career man who comes down from the Midlands with his well-researched theories and his expertise and runs into distrust from the shop floor every time he opens his mouth…”
You’ve selectively left out this for some reason.
''I am sick at heart at the closure of the Park Royal factory…
As for Parvitt’s words they could have applied anywhere from AEC to Scammell to Bedford and my employers let alone Hawker or Vickers aircraft.Zb arrogant Northerners insulting a second to none skilled southern workforce covering every sector from automotive to aviation.
I prefaced the argument by saying that they were politicians who knew f.all. You’re not telling me that you trust politicians, are you? 
cav551:
Carryfast has made an excellent point about the RM bus which has a significant part to play in this saga. Once again we can lay the blame at political interference and management politics. The AEC, ParkRoyal and London Transport had created a technically advanced, ultimately very reliable, yet simple; and at the time of conception, economically probably the class leading vehicle. Regrettably it simply got overtaken by events some of which were predictable by the time mainstream production commenced.So why was it not developed?
LT was obliged not just to provide a bus service but to balance its books. As mentioned before in the buses thread, political interference created an almost insolvable problem. LT was in a cleft stick. What were referred to as Platform Staff had become increasingly difficult to recruit and retain. The shift patterns were unattractive, the hours long and/or inconvenient, the pay no longer competitive with other occupations and LT was a comparatively harsh disciplinarian employer. Add these to the stress from traffic congestion and an increasingly less cooperative passenger and one can see why there were difficulties. Immigration from the Carribean which had been almost the mainstay of LT was dwindling rapidly. The various government incomes policies of the time prevented LT from offering pay levels which would compensate. In addition LT was prevented from raising fares to a level which would attract staff, by first political prices policy but also by customer resistance to higher fares. passenger numbers were dwindling. Fewer passenger meant less revenue, meant poor wages, meant staff problems which meant no bus on service which meant disgruntled passengers, which meant fewer passengers, less revenue and an ever revolving not so merry go round.
There was in theory a way out - one man operation which was initially illegal for double deck vehicles. When it was OK it obviously met with Union resistance, this would mean staff cuts: poor management inevitably is met with Union opposition to any move seen as not in its members interest. If there had been management and political will and a long term vision to attract passengers with a better service, then one man operation might have been made to work. It didn’t get a proper chance because LT shot itself in the foot with its meddling in the engineering of the Fleetline and later with the Scania Metropolitan and because it wasn’t allowed to buy the bus it need : the FRM. That aside we lead on to the management politics within Leyland and LT.
The RM was - IS an extremely efficient people mover. One criterion for assessing this is to compare unladen weight with the number of passengers carried. The previous model RT had produced a figure of 296 lb per passenger, the RM 254, The RML reduced this to 235, the Atlantean rose to 275, the Fleetline 277. LT and its partners had developed the FRM, an AEC front entrance, transverse rear engine double decker using a very large percentage of RM components, this in the solitary prototype form gave a figure of 269 while the London spec DM Fleetline was 298. That equates to over a ton of extra unladen weight for the fuel to accelerate… every few hundred yards! To be fair the DMS Fleetline could achieve 251 but Londoners expected a seat and not a cattle truck! On the other hand AEC’s engineers were confident that production FRMs would weigh about 3 cwt less giving 255lbs per passenger.
The FRM had one drawback; it was head and shoulders above the products Leyland had of its own and from Daimler to offer; it was the bus LT staff wanted and needed, its crews, engineering staff and operations department managers all wanted it. Senior management in their ivory towers had ideas of single deck standee cattle trucks. Too embarrassing for Leyland to admit that Southall could so easily eclipse their products, they knew that while the rear platform RM hadn’t sold elsewhere once the provincial operators saw the bus in volume LT service enough would be ordering from AEC… so they killed it off along with AEC’s largest customer for double deck chassis. LT’s senior managers also weren’t prepared to lose face and admit that their plans based on the DMS Fleetline and over-long, single deck, standee buses were the wrong choice.
With the right vehicle LT could have made partial double deck one man operation to work, kept and increased its passengers, improved finances and wages, retrained conductors to drive the additional vehicles required to carry the increased passenger loadings and placated the unions.
Instead the British disease struck; absolutely [zb] hopeless, arrogant, pigheaded, blind, cretinous British senior management with its ever- present contempt for its workforce,suppliers and customers.
Firstly my point is that the benefits of continuing with front engine two man operation way outweighed any supposed downsides at least running into the 1980’s.With both LT’s maintenance and general passenger preference both being happy with the continuation of same at least until that point.While the downsides were laughably over played.On that note I think the premature end of RM production was the bigger elephant in the room than what happened regarding its successor with the damage caused by that prematurely cut short production life having already been done.
Also think that we’re dealing with an intentional and deliberate wrecking of our manufacturing capabilities as part of the catastrophic switch from a manufacturing based economy to a service based one.All as part of a long term geopolitical plan regarding the post war rebuilding of Europe.With all too predictable results on the specialised automotive and aerospace industries which characterised this part of the UK being taken out first.
[zb]
anorak:
I prefaced the argument by saying that they were politicians who knew f.all. You’re not telling me that you trust politicians, are you?
To be fair I’d be more willing to trust one who wasn’t saying something along the lines of ‘‘While I sympathise with the affected workforce we have to base decisions on the bigger economic picture and the interests of the Group and its investors’’ as a whole.Which translates as the interests of US foreign policy and what’s good for Europe ( German bankers and their Brit investors ).Might as well add Napier and Vickers and Hawker aerospace ( and Pyrene/Chubb Fire Vehicles division ) to the list of all those sacrificed along with Bedford,Scammell and AEC that was just the automotive and aerospace sectors.Let alone names like Gillette,Trico Folberth and Hoover being wiped off the local industrial landscape.All the workers’ fault.
Edit to add.Might as well include all this within Parvitt’s comments and put the whole issue into perspective.Conspiracy not ■■■■ up nor militant workers.
You can argue the finer points until the cows come home but in a nutshell. Poor management, bloody minded unions and political interference with the forced merger of BMC and Leyland.
RED KEN.
Carryfast:
… Gillette,Trico Folberth and Hoover being wiped off the local industrial landscape.All the workers’ fault.
Haha- I did a short stint in the R&D office of Trico, as it was being wound down. Indeed, I thought the firm was well worth saving- there was nothing like the management/shop floor arguments which characterised the Park Royal closure. It relocated to Pontypool, with Government incentives to go there, as I remember it. The other incentive was the value of the land in Brentford. Pontypool was a green field site, with green field staff, but they made a go of it, and it still works.
[zb]
anorak:Carryfast:
… Gillette,Trico Folberth and Hoover being wiped off the local industrial landscape.All the workers’ fault.Haha- I did a short stint in the R&D office of Trico, as it was being wound down. Indeed, I thought the firm was well worth saving- there was nothing like the management/shop floor arguments which characterised the Park Royal closure. It relocated to Pontypool, with Government incentives to go there, as I remember it. The other incentive was the value of the land in Brentford. Pontypool was a green field site, with green field staff, but they made a go of it, and it still works.
I think at the time one of the reasons given for the Southall closure was high rates and the site went up for sale for around 10 million
If unskilled work (Heathrow)was paying more than vehicle assembly, and the land was worth selling, surely those facts trump any of the debatable management versus shop floor arguments? Vehicle manufacturing in any London suburb must have become uneconomic before the 1970s. The relocation of AEC’s work was inevitable.
More interesting is the subsequent decline of Leyland’s bus production. As far as I can make out, the National and Titan were competitive vehicles. What went wrong there?
[zb]
anorak:
If unskilled work (Heathrow)was paying more than vehicle assembly, and the land was worth selling, surely those facts trump any of the debatable management versus shop floor arguments? Vehicle manufacturing in any London suburb must have become uneconomic before the 1970s. The relocation of AEC’s work was inevitable.More interesting is the subsequent decline of Leyland’s bus production. As far as I can make out, the National and Titan were competitive vehicles. What went wrong there?
The National was discussed recently on the Bus and Lorry thread…it was a disaster with the headless wonder 500 Series engine. Plus its concept was all wrong, the clue being its name ‘National’. In other words it was a standard bus specification that was supposed to be suitable for every town and city from Lands End to John O’ Groats. Leyland management was still trying to “sell what we make” and not what the customer wanted. In the days of municipally run bus fleets, with autocratic (even dictatorial) General Managers in many instances, the chassis builder had to agree to build what the customer wanted to stand any chance of getting business.
There are as many reasons for the failure of BL as there were vehicle marques and models in its portfolio of brands during its existence, and even in recent months I have unearthed unknown or forgotten snippets of information. The recent death of Sir Michael Edwardes had me researching his career at the helm of BL. At the distance of 40 years since he took charge of BL I believe that the pity was that he wasn’t appointed a few years earlier. Yes, he was a totally ruthless manager who had to focus all his energy into the car making divisions and their horrendous problems. He eschewed the centralised Leyland management structure he inherited. The devolved management he introduced to Jaguar and Land Rover transformed the fortunes of those marques. Now, imagine if he had been appointed say, in 1972, and given devolved management to Leyland, AEC, Scammell, and Guy, would it, could it all have been different? The premium heavy vehicles divisions were profitable and they had nothing like the industrial relations problems of the car making factories. It might just have given us a British commercial vehicle industry to this day.
[zb]
anorak:
If unskilled work (Heathrow)was paying more than vehicle assembly, and the land was worth selling, surely those facts trump any of the debatable management versus shop floor arguments? Vehicle manufacturing in any London suburb must have become uneconomic before the 1970s. The relocation of AEC’s work was inevitable.More interesting is the subsequent decline of Leyland’s bus production. As far as I can make out, the National and Titan were competitive vehicles. What went wrong there?
That is ignoring the hand in glove relationship between London Transport and its own Associated Equipment Company. The AEC had always been the principle supplier of buses for London. The AEC had been set up exactly for that purpose by the Underground Group when it had taken over the London General Omnibus Company in 1912. The London Passenger Transport Board, later to be the London Transport Executive was a major shareholder in the AEC. It was simply unthinkable that London would not buy the majority of its buses from the AEC. Each company had significant technical input into the others operation.
While the Titan was to be a Leyland vehicle intended to replace the Atlantean, Fleetline and Bristol VR in fleets throughout the country, it was however to be primarily designed to meet London Transport’s specification and as such the best place for it to be built was at Southall, close to LT’s engineering HQ. The design input went as far as LT lending FRM1 to Leyland for study. The deal was that LT guaranteed to take a significant number of vehicles in exchange. In the event the Titan did not sell outside London, the hoped for massive orders from provincial operators never materialised, most put off by the technically advanced specification: Dual doors, Hydracyclic planetary gearbox, Rack and Pinion power steering, Integral construstion primarily in Aluminium, air suspension, Power hydraulic brakes along with Hydraulic spring brake actuators for parking, and what was to be a fairly troublesome drop centre rear axle.
The Leyland National was a take it or leave it design,(arrogant Leyland management, ‘you’ll have what you’re given and like it’) initially produced only in a one overall colour, town-bus seated, dual door 37ft long version which was simply too big for many operators who did not want two doors anyway but did want traditional ‘dual purpose’ two tone livery and more comfortable seating for longer journeys. The vehicle was of integral sheet metal construction with the fixed head Leyland 500 series engine. London Transport did not buy it initially preferring to take a small batch of the Metro Scanias which impressed - enough to order 60 odd Scania Metropolitans. This in turn leading the signifiant orders later placed for the MCW Metrobus - again with LT’s modifications.
The National became the standard NBC bus so it cannot really be called a failure. The engine issues were eventually overcome as operators got used to regular engine changes and slowly disappeared with various different engine transplants eventually arriving at a vertically installed Gardner engine.
gingerfold:
The National was discussed recently on the Bus and Lorry thread…it was a disaster with the headless wonder 500 Series engine. Plus its concept was all wrong, the clue being its name ‘National’. In other words it was a standard bus specification that was supposed to be suitable for every town and city from Lands End to John O’ Groats. Leyland management was still trying to “sell what we make” and not what the customer wanted. In the days of municipally run bus fleets, with autocratic (even dictatorial) General Managers in many instances, the chassis builder had to agree to build what the customer wanted to stand any chance of getting business.There are as many reasons for the failure of BL as there were vehicle marques and models in its portfolio of brands during its existence, and even in recent months I have unearthed unknown or forgotten snippets of information. The recent death of Sir Michael Edwardes had me researching his career at the helm of BL. At the distance of 40 years since he took charge of BL I believe that the pity was that he wasn’t appointed a few years earlier. Yes, he was a totally ruthless manager who had to focus all his energy into the car making divisions and their horrendous problems. He eschewed the centralised Leyland management structure he inherited. The devolved management he introduced to Jaguar and Land Rover transformed the fortunes of those marques. Now, imagine if he had been appointed say, in 1972, and given devolved management to Leyland, AEC, Scammell, and Guy, would it, could it all have been different? The premium heavy vehicles divisions were profitable and they had nothing like the industrial relations problems of the car making factories. It might just have given us a British commercial vehicle industry to this day.
Ironically the Rover/Triumph switch to fwd Jap crap knock offs was on his watch.By all accounts he signed the deal with our Oriental friends and the rest is history.It’s more likely that Jaguar’s management rightly gave him an ultimatum leave us alone or we’ll walk away.Which probably explains how,unlike under the following Ford debacle,Jaguar’s management made sure that no V8 engine option was ever allowed to usurp its V12 masterpiece,the word being in total defiance of Edwardes’ demands,with it ending production after a 25 year run in the stroked 6 litre form that it should have been from the start.It’s also no surprise that maintaining development of the Rover V8 powered Land Rover options also saved that division from going the same way as Rover and Triumph car divisions.The fact is BL’s demise was predictable and was no accident and it had nothing whatsoever to do with its workforce.While ironically,contrary to the propaganda,JRT’s high point was arguably those years under Stokes’ management.While it’s clear that the sabotage of AEC’s bus and all of Leyland’s truck divisions went along similar lines as that of Rover and Triumph.With the premature ending of products like the RM being no different to that of the Triumph 2.5 and Rover P6 ranges.IE getting rid of the most effective threats to the foreign competition and foreign takeover which the treacherous government was always backing.