Carryfast:
…It seems strange why you selectively turn a blind eye to the ‘cyclic tensile’ load on the cylinder head fastenings…
I’ve mentioned them a few times. I’ve explained the difference between the dimensional constraints for the head bolts and the big end bolts. I hope I’ve entertained somebody, but it’s obvious I’m just putting fatigue damage into a keyboard with you.
Do you agree with the figures of 43% x 2 % more tensile stress on the TL12’s head fasteners and 43% x 7% more compressive load on the ends to match the potential and proven specific torque output of the Eagle or not.If so good luck with that.
If not provide your figures as to why.
Stokes was essentially a salesman, and while he successfully led Leyland Motor Corporation in the period up to 1968, never really got to grips with the scale and politics of British Leyland, which had now incorporated BMC, Rover, Jaguar and related commercial vehicle marques with nearly 40 factories and over 100 business units.
His efforts to bring in senior executives from competitors were only partially successful, and persistent infighting (such as the refusal of Triumph to accept the Rover V8 engine for the Stag convertible, and the discrimination against MG in allocating investment funding in favour of Triumph) whilst the inherent unprofitability of BMC sapped the competitive position of the new business. Meanwhile, Leyland Motor Corporation’s new engine policy of the late 1960s had failed, with the AEC V8 and the Rover Gas Turbine being dropped by 1973 and the Leyland 500 series fixed head engine confined to lower-powered, mainly bus applications before being dropped in 1979; the thirst of the gas turbine and the unreliability of the V8 (which had been rushed to market as an under-developed unit) and the 500-series cost sales and enabled Scania and Volvo to enter the UK market.
Both before and during his period of leadership, the British motor industry suffered from poor profitability, which went hand in hand with chronic lack of investment in production technologies and facilities. In 1975, towards the end of Stokes’ time at the helm of the company, a journalist compared the published number of employees and the published number of cars produced by various automakers, Toyota produced 36 cars per employee while Honda produced nearly 23: BLMC produced slightly more than four cars per employee in 1975 as against more than 7 for Ford’s UK plants. Factors such as the variable extent of dependence on brought-in sub-assemblies made the comparison imperfect, but the continuing lack of profitability resulting from continuing failure to invest intelligently in up to date production processes was all too real. This was a part of the background to BL’s famously awful industrial relations during the 1970s
Which translated means, Stokes [zb] ed BL and Edwardes came in with a new broom to clean up the shambles.
That is the gist I get from reading various articles to be found on the WWW. The timing says all really. Like or loath Edwards, when he joined the ship it was already washing the gunwales. Stokes referred to as a jumped up bus salesman in not so many words.
Stokes actually served an engineering apprenticeship at Leyland including studying at the Harris Institute of Technology in Preston.
He also served his country during WW2 reaching the rank of Leutenant Colonel in the REME.
Remind me what did Edwardes do let alone know about one end of an engine to the other.
The timing certainly does say it all.
He left his tenure as CEO of Leyland with AEC still a going concern albeit crippled by its own designs and the government allowing the LT Board to take out AEC’s bus production and Edwardes to finish the job.
What Stokes would have known was that the 8.8 AEC motor wasn’t fitted in the Matador and he would have known why.The fact that he didn’t order Scammell to only use the TL12 in its products as opposed to Edwardes ordering it to be used in the T45 shows who the asset stripping charlatan was here and it wasn’t Stokes.
Just
Carryfast:
…It seems strange why you selectively turn a blind eye to the ‘cyclic tensile’ load on the cylinder head fastenings…
I’ve mentioned them a few times. I’ve explained the difference between the dimensional constraints for the head bolts and the big end bolts. I hope I’ve entertained somebody, but it’s obvious I’m just putting fatigue damage into a keyboard with you.
‘Dimensional constraints’ as in not required to need anywhere close to the tensile strength of the head and mains fasteners because the compressive loads on the piston and rod assembly and reaction of same on the head way out weigh the tensile loads on the big end fastenings.
The less leverage you’ve got the more those compressive loads will be.
ramone:
I’ve just started reading Edwards book and he mentions a figure of 250000 lost vehicles due to strikes in one year , a figure i think is correct but i have slept since yesterday evening. Its qute interesting that Stokes left BL in such an excellent financial state with an amicable workforce and a range of car and commercial vehicles second to none then Edwards comes and wrecks it all … i think not we all know who was in control of the wrecking ball Stokes and the red army
Remind me again who was the boss of Leyland and had been for two years when Laurie Pavitt made his statement to the house in Hansard.
When did AEC close.
Don’t see anything in that statement regarding strikes and if there were they were usually justified such as ripping off Triumph workers with the new wage regime.
Who put the TL12 take it or leave it in the Roadtrain.
Who was it who turned Rover and Triumph into makers of down market front wheel drive Jap crap to the benefit of BMW and tied Rover to the remains of BMC.
When did Stokes tenure as CEO end.
ramone:
BL decided that AEC would no longer produce double deckers so as to push the Atlantean , Fleetline and Bristols they were producing . Another strange decision by Stokes and co . Leyland tried and failed for the rest of their existence to come up with a bus to succeed the Routemaster in the capital but hey ho Stokes knew best.
According to cav, the Routemaster being taken out of production but which was still in demand 15 years later, because LT wanted to go for OMO, against the wishes of crew’s unions and passengers and maintenance staff, was a good thing.
Yes it was a good thing for AEC because the front engine and rear entrance design was out of date by 1968/9 and NO ONE wanted to buy them. Leyland ceased production of the PD3 in 1969 and the low floor Bristol Lodekka - ceased production in 1968. AEC’s own Regent V production line closed in 1968 as well. Daimler stopped producing the CVG6 even for export in 1969, The last GUY Arab V entered service in 1969; the last Dennis Lolines and Albion Lowlanders in 1966. The fact that any of these vehicles were still in limited regular use 25 or or even 37 years later has no bearing whatsoever on whether it was profitable for their manufacturers to continue producing them after the late 1960s.
If you want to start up a Video tape player production factory feel welcome.
Carryfast:
According to cav, the Routemaster being taken out of production but which was still in demand 15 years later, because LT wanted to go for OMO, against the wishes of crew’s unions and passengers and maintenance staff, was a good thing.
Yes it was a good thing for AEC because the front engine and rear entrance design was out of date by 1968/9 and NO ONE wanted to buy them.
It’s clear that the definition of ‘NO ONE’ in that was only those looking for a profit from OMO and in positions of purchase.
That’s not the same thing as the end user in the form of crews, maintenance staff and passengers.
Not to mention the predictable damage done to AEC which wasn’t ready or able to meet such a needless change.
So LT saved a penny in crew costs lost a fiver in operational costs and at least the loss of AEC’s bus operations.
Then as usual Stokes gets the blame.
Carryfast:
…It seems strange why you selectively turn a blind eye to the ‘cyclic tensile’ load on the cylinder head fastenings…
I’ve mentioned them a few times. I’ve explained the difference between the dimensional constraints for the head bolts and the big end bolts. I hope I’ve entertained somebody, but it’s obvious I’m just putting fatigue damage into a keyboard with you.
‘Dimensional constraints’ as in not required to need anywhere close to the tensile strength of the head and mains fasteners because the compressive loads on the piston and rod assembly and reaction of same on the head way out weigh the tensile loads on the big end fastenings.
The less leverage you’ve got the more those compressive loads will be.
So what? There’s plenty of space to put the bolts. It is never an issue. Have a look at marine diesels- some of them have a bore of 6 foot, and a BMEP over 20 bar. You’re clutching at straws, to support your half-an-argument.
Carryfast:
…It seems strange why you selectively turn a blind eye to the ‘cyclic tensile’ load on the cylinder head fastenings…
I’ve mentioned them a few times. I’ve explained the difference between the dimensional constraints for the head bolts and the big end bolts. I hope I’ve entertained somebody, but it’s obvious I’m just putting fatigue damage into a keyboard with you.
‘Dimensional constraints’ as in not required to need anywhere close to the tensile strength of the head and mains fasteners because the compressive loads on the piston and rod assembly and reaction of same on the head way out weigh the tensile loads on the big end fastenings.
The less leverage you’ve got the more those compressive loads will be.
So what? There’s plenty of space to put the bolts. It is never an issue. Have a look at marine diesels- some of them have a bore of 6 foot, and a BMEP over 20 bar. You’re clutching at straws, to support your half-an-argument.
Wartzila 96 cm bore x 2.5 metre stroke.
BMEP is just based on peak specific torque which means force x distance.
The Wartzila’s 0.38 bore stroke ratio is obviously all about maximising the distance side of that equation while minimising the force side of it and therefore obviously isn’t helping your case.It’s obviously you who’s clutching at straws.
You didn’t answer the question the TL12 needed 43% x 2% more tensile load on its head fastenings and 43% x 7% more compressive load on its ends to match the specific torque of the Eagle.The Eagle wasn’t throwing con rods at 1,950 rpm.
Yes or no ?.
ramone:
I’ve just started reading Edwards book and he mentions a figure of 250000 lost vehicles due to strikes in one year , a figure i think is correct but i have slept since yesterday evening. Its qute interesting that Stokes left BL in such an excellent financial state with an amicable workforce and a range of car and commercial vehicles second to none then Edwards comes and wrecks it all … i think not we all know who was in control of the wrecking ball Stokes and the red army
Remind me again who was the boss of Leyland and had been for two years when Laurie Pavitt made his statement to the house in Hansard.
When did AEC close.
Don’t see anything in that statement regarding strikes and if there were they were usually justified such as ripping off Triumph workers with the new wage regime.
Who put the TL12 take it or leave it in the Roadtrain.
Who was it who turned Rover and Triumph into makers of down market front wheel drive Jap crap to the benefit of BMW and tied Rover to the remains of BMC.
When did Stokes tenure as CEO end.
Aec had stopped making lorries and were in the process of halting production of the Reliance when Edwards took over the result of under funding and sabotage from Stokes and his team .BL was in turmoil when Edwards took over bankrupt and crippled by industrial action , See if you can remind us of what the average top weight tractor unit would be putting out bhp wise when the TL12 was dropped due to financial reasons
Plenty of room for head bolts. Not an issue, whatever the size of engine, which is why I alerted you to the big marine engine. If you are going to use the bore/stroke ratio of that engine to whip the designers of the TL12, take the equation I posted for you up there- the one which gives the centrifugal load on the big end as a function of the engine speed and stroke- and plot a graph of that load at rated engine speed versus stroke.
So far, that is effectively all you have done- used the dimensions of modern engines and much bigger engines, to rubbish one successful engine from years ago, with arguments which have been rendered laughable by the successes of other contemporary engines. If you were clever enough to make such decisions, you would have had a job as an engine designer. Even listening to the chat on here should have helped you get a bit closer to that level, but it has not- at all.
ramone:
AEC had stopped making lorries and were in the process of halting production of the Reliance when Edwards took over the result of under funding and sabotage from Stokes and his team .BL was in turmoil when Edwards took over bankrupt and crippled by industrial action , See if you can remind us of what the average top weight tractor unit would be putting out bhp wise when the TL12 was dropped due to financial reasons
Exactly what evidence says that the TL12 was dropped ‘due to financial reasons’ as opposed to couldn’t make the grade v Eagle and 14 litre ■■■■■■■■
So according to you AEC had supposedly ‘stopped making lorries’ in 1975 when Stokes left the job of CEO let alone when Edwardes took over in 1977.Yeah right.
Your story of AEC’s run down and closure doesn’t ‘seem to match the facts’ or even gingerfold’s story.Some would call it downright lies.
No surprise there in the silly witch hunt against Stokes.
Edwardes took over a going concern car division and truck and bus and trashed it all to the advantage of the foreign competition.
As opposed to maintaining Rover and Triumph’s position and ditching the TL12 and bringing RR on board ready for launch of the Roadtrain.Both as boss of NEB and Leyland.
Oh and no Stokes wasn’t ‘head honcho’ in 1976 let alone 1977.While Edwardes was ultimately boss of both Leyland and RR as boss of NEB when Stokes stepped down in '75.Followed by Leyland in 1977.
The rest is history.RR was kept in the wilderness then handed over to Vickers in 1979 and the T45 was lumbered with the TL12.
350m spent and he puts the TL12 in it. aronline.co.uk/facts-and-fig … turns-35./
ramone:
See if you can remind us of what the average top weight tractor unit would be putting out bhp wise when the TL12 was dropped
See if you can remind us what the Eagle was putting out in 1984.You really think that 273 hp and less than 900 lbft was going to cut it at 38t gross.
You seem to have missed what happened during the 10 years between 1973-1983 or those years ever even happened.You might have got away with all your bs when referring 1973 but not 1983.
Like your AEC anchor you’re way out of your depth at that point in time.
As I said the bankers wanted their share of the 350m back before handing over the firm to the foreign competition and they weren’t going to get it with warranty claims for blown up intercooled TL12’s raining down.
ramone:
AEC had stopped making lorries and were in the process of halting production of the Reliance when Edwards took over the result of under funding and sabotage from Stokes and his team .BL was in turmoil when Edwards took over bankrupt and crippled by industrial action , See if you can remind us of what the average top weight tractor unit would be putting out bhp wise when the TL12 was dropped due to financial reasons
Exactly what evidence says that the TL12 was dropped ‘due to financial reasons’ as opposed to couldn’t make the grade v Eagle and 14 litre ■■■■■■■■
So according to you AEC had supposedly ‘stopped making lorries’ in 1975 when Stokes left the job of CEO let alone when Edwardes took over in 1977.Yeah right.
Your story of AEC’s run down and closure doesn’t ‘seem to match the facts’ or even gingerfold’s story.Some would call it downright lies.
No surprise there in the silly witch hunt against Stokes.
Edwardes took over a going concern car division and truck and bus and trashed it all to the advantage of the foreign competition.
As opposed to maintaining Rover and Triumph’s position and ditching the TL12 and bringing RR on board ready for launch of the Roadtrain.Both as boss of NEB and Leyland.
Oh and no Stokes wasn’t ‘head honcho’ in 1976 let alone 1977.While Edwardes was ultimately boss of both Leyland and RR as boss of NEB when Stokes stepped down in '75.Followed by Leyland in 1977.
The rest is history.RR was kept in the wilderness then handed over to Vickers in 1979 and the T45 was lumbered with the TL12.
350m spent and he puts the TL12 in it. aronline.co.uk/facts-and-fig … turns-35./
Aec lorries were built to 1976 with a few orders left for Mammoth Majors supplied to the military . When Edwards took over the government were very reluctant to prop BL up and so were the banks Edwards had to plead with banks for money , the place was in disaray with many of the 50 sites needing massive investment , money of which they didnt have
The group had a central base in London where all the decisions were being made instead of the factories where they should have been made Edwards changed that he didnt take over until November 1977 the very same day the Speke factory went on strike. He changed and reduced the board by half and then started on the central office which was top heavy with high paid managers . He had walked into a company that was on the brink of closing with no money and had been run for years into the ground . Unions had taken over interviewing for new staff , you couldnt make it up
Aec lorries were built to 1976 with a few orders left for Mammoth Ma couldnt make it up
Did you actually read the CM article or the Hansard statement of Laurie Pavitt and how much cash was thrown at the T45’s design and production.
1976 Stokes had gone in 1975.Remind me who was in charge of Leyland from '77-82.
Which part of Stokes left the job in 1975 with AEC still making trucks at least until 1979, let alone 1975, don’t you understand.
Edwardes closed down AEC, with a lot of help by LT board stopping the Routemaster before that, not Stokes.
Edwardes’ claim to fame was putting the TL12 in the Roadtrain at launch after 350m had been spent on it, instead of bringing RR in house to power it and the run down and closure of AEC.
Also turning Rover and Triumph into makers of Honda knock offs.
That all ended well.
Plenty of room for head bolts. Not an issue, whatever the size of engine, which is why I alerted you to the big marine engine. If you are going to use the bore/stroke ratio of that engine to whip the designers of the TL12, take the equation I posted for you up there- the one which gives the centrifugal load on the big end as a function of the engine speed and stroke- and plot a graph of that load at rated engine speed versus stroke.
You’re the one who’s suggesting that the Eagle’s con rods and big end bearing caps would fly apart at 1,950 rpm you do it.
You’re also the one who suggested a 6 foot bore for the Wartzila when in fact it’s less than 3 with a 6.5 foot stroke and still that isn’t enough of a clue for you.
Head bolts bs you’re going to use 43% x 2% more head fastening and 43% x 7% more big end and small end provision when Rolls are already making a motor which is more than up to the job yeah right.
No surprise that Edwardes is your hero.But even he and his banker mates had the sense to realise which was the better choice at the end of the day to get their money back and at least leave a few customers for DAF to evetually pick up.
ramone:
AEC had stopped making lorries and were in the process of halting production of the Reliance when Edwards took over the result of under funding and sabotage from Stokes and his team .BL was in turmoil when Edwards took over bankrupt and crippled by industrial action , See if you can remind us of what the average top weight tractor unit would be putting out bhp wise when the TL12 was dropped due to financial reasons
Exactly what evidence says that the TL12 was dropped ‘due to financial reasons’ as opposed to couldn’t make the grade v Eagle and 14 litre ■■■■■■■■
So according to you AEC had supposedly ‘stopped making lorries’ in 1975 when Stokes left the job of CEO let alone when Edwardes took over in 1977.Yeah right.
Your story of AEC’s run down and closure doesn’t ‘seem to match the facts’ or even gingerfold’s story.Some would call it downright lies.
No surprise there in the silly witch hunt against Stokes.
Edwardes took over a going concern car division and truck and bus and trashed it all to the advantage of the foreign competition.
As opposed to maintaining Rover and Triumph’s position and ditching the TL12 and bringing RR on board ready for launch of the Roadtrain.Both as boss of NEB and Leyland.
Oh and no Stokes wasn’t ‘head honcho’ in 1976 let alone 1977.While Edwardes was ultimately boss of both Leyland and RR as boss of NEB when Stokes stepped down in '75.Followed by Leyland in 1977.
The rest is history.RR was kept in the wilderness then handed over to Vickers in 1979 and the T45 was lumbered with the TL12.
350m spent and he puts the TL12 in it. aronline.co.uk/facts-and-fig … turns-35./
Aec lorries were built to 1976 with a few orders left for Mammoth Majors supplied to the military . When Edwards took over the government were very reluctant to prop BL up and so were the banks Edwards had to plead with banks for money , the place was in disaray with many of the 50 sites needing massive investment , money of which they didnt have
The group had a central base in London where all the decisions were being made instead of the factories where they should have been made Edwards changed that he didnt take over until November 1977 the very same day the Speke factory went on strike. He changed and reduced the board by half and then started on the central office which was top heavy with high paid managers . He had walked into a company that was on the brink of closing with no money and had been run for years into the ground . Unions had taken over interviewing for new staff , you couldnt make it up
Why do I think that sounds more plausible than the other argument/account. To be fair the decline happened over a long period of time and probably it is unfair to lay the blame at the door of any one individual. What was lacking was really good leadership, without historical agendas, that could cut the deadwood and use funds more carefully for development. That need to happen with Leyland group /AEC in the early 60 and more importantly the late 60s with the BMC group. I am no expert but I have said before that it would have been difficult to dispose of deadwood/the unnecessary duplication with the predominantly Labour govt and unions of the day.
Stokes actually served an engineering apprenticeship at Leyland including studying at the Harris Institute of Technology in Preston.
He also served his country during WW2 reaching the rank of Leutenant Colonel in the REME.
Remind me what did Edwardes do let alone know about one end of an engine to the other.
The timing certainly does say it all.
He left his tenure as CEO of Leyland with AEC still a going concern albeit crippled by its own designs and the government allowing the LT Board to take out AEC’s bus production and Edwardes to finish the job.
What Stokes would have known was that the 8.8 AEC motor wasn’t fitted in the Matador and he would have known why.The fact that he didn’t order Scammell to only use the TL12 in its products as opposed to Edwardes ordering it to be used in the T45 shows who the asset stripping charlatan was here and it wasn’t Stokes.
Just
[/quote]
Edwardes the asset stripper you do know the reason Thatcher didn’t renew his contract in 1982 was because he didn’t want to split BL up. Thatcher wanted BL (and pretty much everything else) privatised she wanted the profitable parts, Jaguar, Land rover etc sold off, Edwardes resisted and paid the price.
The deal with Honda came about because there was no money to develop a replacement for the Allegro, Dolomite and Marina/Ital. He did the only thing he was able to do and joined forces with another company. In this case that was Honda which resulted in the Ballade based Acclaim. You yourself provided an excellent link showing that the Acclaim was a success for the company. It was a top ten selling car and the LEAST warrantied BL car.
The Rover 800 came about because of the success of the Acclaim he was keen to work with Honda again. Because the new mid range cars were already well developed (Maestro and Montego) it was decided to use the large Honda as the base for the new big Rover.
Business experts have stated that this was the start of the Japanese entry into GB (Nissan and Toyota)
C.F, These are the Gardner Engines that served the haulage industrey for years, And thats where the present vehicle makers got their info from, Lewis Gardner Ltd Patticroft, Manchester, Give me a good old Gardner Engine any day, Regards Larry.
ramone:
Aec lorries were built to 1976 with a few orders left for Mammoth Majors supplied to the military . When Edwards took over the government were very reluctant to prop BL up and so were the banks Edwards had to plead with banks for money , the place was in disaray with many of the 50 sites needing massive investment , money of which they didnt have
The group had a central base in London where all the decisions were being made instead of the factories where they should have been made Edwards changed that he didnt take over until November 1977 the very same day the Speke factory went on strike. He changed and reduced the board by half and then started on the central office which was top heavy with high paid managers . He had walked into a company that was on the brink of closing with no money and had been run for years into the ground . Unions had taken over interviewing for new staff , you couldnt make it up
Why do I think that sounds more plausible than the other argument/account. To be fair the decline happened over a long period of time and probably it is unfair to lay the blame at the door of any one individual. What was lacking was really good leadership, without historical agendas, that could cut the deadwood and use funds more carefully for development. That need to happen with Leyland group /AEC in the early 60 and more importantly the late 60s with the BMC group. I am no expert but I have said before that it would have been difficult to dispose of deadwood/the unnecessary duplication with the predominantly Labour govt and unions of the day.
How can 1976 mean anything when you’ve got ducumented evidence of the last Marathon rolling off the line in 1979 and 1977 reg Mercurys and how can Stokes be blamed for closing AEC in 1979, when he left the job in 1975 with it still producing trucks.
Oh and remind me who was PM when those banner waving AEC Bolsheviks were trying to save their jobs and the firm.Which obviously would have been far easier if production of the Routemaster was only at that point being ‘planned’ to end as opposed to ended 11 years previously and if RR Eagle production and Scammell’s operations had all been transferred to Southall with closure of Tolpits Lane.
But no the Thatcherites and Edwardes fans still say it was all Stokes’ fault and the Labour Party wot dun it.While at the same time defending the worst mistakes of the Stokes and Labour regime in the form of the TL12 powered Marathon and T45 no hopers and Issigonis’ front wheel drive heaps.Then sending Rover and Triumph all Japanese.
You couldn’t make it up.
dazcapri:
Stokes actually served an engineering apprenticeship at Leyland including studying at the Harris Institute of Technology in Preston.
He also served his country during WW2 reaching the rank of Leutenant Colonel in the REME.
Remind me what did Edwardes do let alone know about one end of an engine to the other.
The timing certainly does say it all.
He left his tenure as CEO of Leyland with AEC still a going concern albeit crippled by its own designs and the government allowing the LT Board to take out AEC’s bus production and Edwardes to finish the job.
What Stokes would have known was that the 8.8 AEC motor wasn’t fitted in the Matador and he would have known why.The fact that he didn’t order Scammell to only use the TL12 in its products as opposed to Edwardes ordering it to be used in the T45 shows who the asset stripping charlatan was here and it wasn’t Stokes.
Just
Edwardes the asset stripper you do know the reason Thatcher didn’t renew his contract in 1982 was because he didn’t want to split BL up. Thatcher wanted BL (and pretty much everything else) privatised she wanted the profitable parts, Jaguar, Land rover etc sold off, Edwardes resisted and paid the price.
The deal with Honda came about because there was no money to develop a replacement for the Allegro, Dolomite and Marina/Ital. He did the only thing he was able to do and joined forces with another company. In this case that was Honda which resulted in the Ballade based Acclaim. You yourself provided an excellent link showing that the Acclaim was a success for the company. It was a top ten selling car and the LEAST warrantied BL car.
The Rover 800 came about because of the success of the Acclaim he was keen to work with Honda again. Because the new mid range cars were already well developed (Maestro and Montego) it was decided to use the large Honda as the base for the new big Rover.
Business experts have stated that this was the start of the Japanese entry into GB (Nissan and Toyota)
[/quote]
If Edwardes didn’t want BL to be split up how did Rover end up tied to Austin and Triumph was turned into an Acclaim producing basket case then closed down.
Why would anyone need the Acclaim of all things to replace the far superior Dolomite FFS.
Like SD1 and 800 to replace the 2.5.
Also why didn’t he merge Scammell with AEC by moving Scammell into Southall together with RR diesels.
The only thing that Edwardes kept together was what he knew would do the most damage to the firm in the form of keeping BMC going and tying it round the kneck of Rover.While smashing the Jaguar Rover Triumph premium partnership for obvious reasons and vice versa by sabotaging the T45 and closing down AEC and by implication Scammell with it.
Edwardes was the best CEO that Leyland’s competitors ever had.
Then Stokes gets the blame.
