The Carryfast engine design discussion

[zb]
anorak:

Carryfast:
The question was DAF shareholding ■■ in Leyland before the ‘merger’ .Also the government calling a takeover a merger including the issue of the 60% controlling interest.

Yep normal design criterea for a forced induction truck engine is all about mitigating compressive loads.Not inertial tensile loads at 2,000 rpm or less.

Are you seriously suggesting that big end bearing cap fastenings are the same tensile spec as mains and head bolts.
■■■■■■■ ISX for example same grade for both head and main caps.Nothing about big ends.
Tightening of 300 lbft + 90 degrees head and 110 lbft + 180 degrees main caps and 50 lbft + 60 degrees big end caps is also a clue.

Tensile loads aren’t an issue and if even they were a larger piston at higher engine speed isn’t going to help in that regard.

No I’m not saying that I’m better than AEC’s designers 50 years ago.I’m saying that RR’s and Volvo’s and ■■■■■■■■ and Mack’s and even to an extent Gardner’s were.I also don’t believe that most of AEC’s designs were dictated by what the designers ideally wanted but meeting location ideals and cash restraints.No one jumps from the bore stroke ratios of the 173 and 590 to the TL12 to meet any bs ‘tensile’ loading concerns.

Designers consider all loads and stresses in all areas. They do not launch alehouse bragging campaigns about one bolt versus another. In the 1970s, engines of a range of bore/stroke ratios were competitive. As usual, you are trying to judge engineering from years ago, against the specifications of modern engines, ISX for example. That does not qualify you to judge the designers of AEC, Gardner or ■■■■■■■■

Torque wrench settings do not tell us much about the loads on the joints. Why don’t you calculate the in-service tensile stress of the three bolts? That is, after all, what the engineer specifying the bolts would have at the front of his mind. You could then calculate the shear stress in the threads, then specify a suitable grade of cast iron for the cylinder block, and forging steel for the rods.

That in a nutshell is a great summary. In one of Bob Fryars’ papers on the design of the AEC 470 engine he goes to great lengths to explain how the correct “strength” of big end fixings was calculated. It was far too technical for my limited engineering knowledge to grasp, but it did illustrate the detail into which engine designers went, and probably explains why straight configuration AEC engines of all types and sizes never gave any bottom end problems. When building an engine it wasn’t a case of going to the parts store and getting a handful of any nuts and bolts.

If you look at three engines in the 12 /12.5 litre category, namely TL12, RR Eagle, and Gardner 6LXDT, all were designed to produce 270 bhp, at various times in their production lives, although the Gardner came into being 10 years after the other two. The three designs had different bore and stroke dimensions, the Gardner with the longest stroke of the three. But the three designs produced the power they were designed for. So how can anyone say which was the right design and which was a wrong design? As for long term development, in the early 1970s who could forecast what the power requirements would be in the 1990s. As it happens I have been looking at the typical fleet engine power rating in the mid-1990s. It was 320 - 360 bhp for 38 tonnes gvw. A very modest increase from the 270 bhp of 20 years before. There were, of course, more powerful engines available, but the bread and butter fleet market, was and still is, where manufacturers make their profits. That is where the volume sales are. Scania will make more profit margin on a 720 bhp V8 engine than it will on a 450 bhp unit, but it wouldn’t survive as a volume manufacturer if that was the only engine option it offered. The mass market for that power at that price simply isn’t there. Today the fleet engine is typically 450 bhp, so in almost 50 years since the TL12 can it be honestly said that there has been a massive increase in power outputs? It has been steady, not spectacular, development.

gingerfold:

Carryfast:
The timeline is all the evidence I need.
AEC didn’t ‘close’ until 4 YEARS AFTER Stokes had left the job of CEO.
4 years in which anyone who supposedly disagreed with the closure could have reversed the decision.
While are you seriously suggesting that Stokes hated AEC so much he maintained its production status throughout his 10 year or so tenure.

The Ryder Report made no mention of closing AEC and it’s documented that Edwardes didn’t follow its supposed recomendations.

Stokes obviously couldn’t have followed it or ditched it either way because he was out of the job at that point.You’re barking up the wrong tree.

Edwardes was the hatchet man parachuted in to sabotage and asset strip Leyland to the benefit of the foreign competition.He also obviously made sure that RR was kept a seperate entity ready for sell off as head of NEB before that.

As for BL Board meetings I’m more interested in finding out who were the minority non government shareholders in Leyland from 1977-87.My bet is DAF, or at least its financial backers, will be in there.Our government was clearly working to a pro mainland European post war economic recovery agenda at our expense.60/40 controlling interest a so called ‘merger’ yeah right.

The last thing they’d have wanted would have been a 130 x 154 AEC DAF killer messing up their plans even if AEC’s designers have had the will or the resources to make it.Just as they didn’t want the Eagle in the Roadtrain at launch.

So your defence of Stokes is a timeline? Evidence? Just your take on it.

If you had ever spoken to any senior AEC, Leyland, Scammell, Guy, Albion manager then they would have told you that Stokes was determined to eventually close AEC from the day he took over. No matter what arguments you make in his defence then you will always be in a minority of one.

So in the 10 years that he was the boss he kept AEC in business including the TL12 powered Marathon and left the firm a going concern in 1975.That seems like a strange way of being determined to ‘eventually close’ AEC.

When the truth is it closed 4 years after he left the job.Ironically in large part because neither Stokes, nor Edwardes as boss of NEB, saw fit to knock the TL12 on the head and bring RR on board.
Edwardes obviously having far more clout and resulting questions over his actions than Stokes in that regard.

Add the premature end of production of the Routemaster bus that’s the perfect storm for AEC none of which can be put at Stokes’ door.

Edwardes then finishing the job of handing over Rover and Triumph and Leyland Group as a whole to the foreign competition.

Are you seriously suggesting that Scammell were supportive of the TL12 powered Roadtrain at launch knowing its own policy on engine supplies and knowing that the 290 Eagle was available again 4 years + after Stokes had left the job. :confused:

Ironically you refuse to even recognise the RR as being the better bet and motor for the job and like others actually being supportive of the actions and management, which actually brought down AEC together with the whole Group.

Carryfast:

ramone:

Carryfast:

ramone:
I’ve ordered the Michael Edwards book anorak it should be an interesting read

Just so long as you go by the premise that what happened between 1977-82 was on his watch.
Which includes the deal with Honda for both Rover and Triumph and the run down and closure of AEC and how the TL12 not RR Eagle ended up as the standard no choice option at launch of the Roadtrain.
But then conveniently dropped, obviously decided by 1982, during the run up to the handover to DAF.
Also seemingly the splitting of the truck and bus divisions for obvious reasons.

AEC Lorry production ceased between '76 and '77 so unless Mr Edwards sat down at his new desk and ordered AEC to stop producing lorries that day you, may i suggest , could have made a mstake.It was a long term plan instigated by your hero Stokes who did the most damage to AEC

What was the firm doing between '77-79 when it closed.Bearing in mind that Gingerfold’s timeline of run down and closure doesn’t seem to match yours.
Like the Triumph debacle didn’t see Edwardes reversing any of the supposed ‘Stokes’ decisions nor the interim MD between 75-77.
When was TL12 production transferred to Leyland ?.
Who was MD of Leyland between '75-'77.Here’s a clue it wasn’t Stokes.
Who was in charge of the NEB when the decision to take RR in house could have been made during the design stage of T45.
When was the ‘decision’ to drop the TL12 from T45 made.

The fact is there’s no evidence that Stokes ever said, let alone implemented, closure of AEC and to not maintain Triumph as a producer of performance saloon cars rivalling the BMW 5 series based on the 2.5.

Stokes was at the meeting in 1971 when the Rover SD1 was chosen as the successor to the P6 and Triumph 2000 it was decided that the Triumph design(a 3 box saloon) was too conservative. The Rover design was judged to be superior by the BL board which included Stokes. It’s in the link in plain English.
aronline.co.uk/cars/rover/s … ent-story/
Here’s another link that states the SD1 was built to REPLACE both the P6 and 2000 range
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rover_SD1 … 0is%20both,)%2C%20under%20the%20Rover%20marque.
Here is the Oxford Dictionary definition of what replacement means since you seem to be having trouble understanding it.
oxfordlearnersdictionaries. … ar%20parts
The next link is a 1973 interview with Stokes where he says the P6 and Triumph 2000 are very complimentary models and then says " I think it makes sense NOT to perpetuate that in the future-two similar cars of similar capacity"
aronline.co.uk/people/peopl … interview/
He is QUOTED as saying Rover and Triumph will no longer compete with each other name another Triumph car other than the 2000 which competed with the Rover range of Cars.
The Triumph 2000 could not have been fitted with a V8 in the late70’s/early 80’s to take on the 5 series because it was replaced by the SD1,Yes it remained in production till 1977 as did the P6 until they were gradually phased out in favour of the SD1 introduced in 1976.
The 2000 range was to be replaced anyway by the Triumph designed Puma so was never going to continue to be made anyway
aronline.co.uk/concepts-and … umph-puma/
Harry Webster designed it to be fitted with the new range of TRIUMPH engines including the Triumph V8 so again the TRIUMPH Engineers decided against using the Rover engine.
Before you start blaming Spen King for not allowing them to use the Rover engine the Truth is the first Triumph designed to use the Rover V8 was the Triumph Lynx designed by SPEN KING ,you know the guy you keep saying wouldn’t fit a Rover V8 into a Triumph
aronline.co.uk/concepts-and … s-triumph/
Donald Stokes decided against releasing it and went with the TR7 instead.

gingerfold:
That in a nutshell is a great summary. In one of Bob Fryars’ papers on the design of the AEC 470 engine he goes to great lengths to explain how the correct “strength” of big end fixings was calculated. It was far too technical for my limited engineering knowledge to grasp, but it did illustrate the detail into which engine designers went, and probably explains why straight configuration AEC engines of all types and sizes never gave any bottom end problems. When building an engine it wasn’t a case of going to the parts store and getting a handful of any nuts and bolts.

If you look at three engines in the 12 /12.5 litre category, namely TL12, RR Eagle, and Gardner 6LXDT, all were designed to produce 270 bhp, at various times in their production lives, although the Gardner came into being 10 years after the other two. The three designs had different bore and stroke dimensions, the Gardner with the longest stroke of the three. But the three designs produced the power they were designed for. So how can anyone say which was the right design and which was a wrong design? As for long term development, in the early 1970s who could forecast what the power requirements would be in the 1990s. As it happens I have been looking at the typical fleet engine power rating in the mid-1990s. It was 320 - 360 bhp for 38 tonnes gvw. A very modest increase from the 270 bhp of 20 years before. There were, of course, more powerful engines available, but the bread and butter fleet market, was and still is, where manufacturers make their profits. That is where the volume sales are. Scania will make more profit margin on a 720 bhp V8 engine than it will on a 450 bhp unit, but it wouldn’t survive as a volume manufacturer if that was the only engine option it offered. The mass market for that power at that price simply isn’t there. Today the fleet engine is typically 450 bhp, so in almost 50 years since the TL12 can it be honestly said that there has been a massive increase in power outputs? It has been steady, not spectacular, development.

The TL12 was introduced in 1973 and around 10 years later it was gone and the Eagle was putting out more than 320.
The Eagle was also putting out a true 290 before launch of the Roadtrain as opposed to the ■■■■■■■ E ‘290’.
The TL12 was obsolete at, if not even before, launch of the Roadtrain.
Whatever caused the TL12 to maintain the 590/690/760’s 142 mm stroke had nothing to do with being the best solution for the job it was meant to do.
270 let alone less than 70 lbft per litre wasn’t the right foreseeable output potential at that time for a max weight truck.
The maths say that compensating for the TL12’s stroke disadvantage would have meant considerably more stress having to be applied to the head fastenings and small and big ends to match the potential of the Eagle which could only increase as outputs grew.
So what did Edwardes do.

dazcapri:

Carryfast:
The fact is there’s no evidence that Stokes ever said, let alone implemented, closure of AEC and to not maintain Triumph as a producer of performance saloon cars rivalling the BMW 5 series based on the 2.5.

Stokes was at the meeting in 1971 when the Rover SD1 was chosen as the successor to the P6 and Triumph 2000 it was decided that the Triumph design(a 3 box saloon) was too conservative. The Rover design was judged to be superior by the BL board which included Stokes. It’s in the link in plain English.
aronline.co.uk/cars/rover/s … ent-story/
Here’s another link that states the SD1 was built to REPLACE both the P6 and 2000 range
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rover_SD1 … 0is%20both,)%2C%20under%20the%20Rover%20marque.
Here is the Oxford Dictionary definition of what replacement means since you seem to be having trouble understanding it.
oxfordlearnersdictionaries. … ar%20parts
The next link is a 1973 interview with Stokes where he says the P6 and Triumph 2000 are very complimentary models and then says " I think it makes sense NOT to perpetuate that in the future-two similar cars of similar capacity"
aronline.co.uk/people/peopl … interview/
He is QUOTED as saying Rover and Triumph will no longer compete with each other name another Triumph car other than the 2000 which competed with the Rover range of Cars.
The Triumph 2000 could not have been fitted with a V8 in the late70’s/early 80’s to take on the 5 series because it was replaced by the SD1

The Triumph 2000 wasn’t the same thing as the Triumph 2.5 PI especially a 2.5 PI with a Rover V8 in it.

Stokes didn’t say Rover does both the plutocrats barges and the performance saloons.
The fact that the 2.5 PI not just the 2000 was replaced by the SD1 let alone the Acclaim is the point.
Nowehere did Stokes or the Ryder report ever say do that.Like AEC still being alive and kicking Triumph was still producing the 2.5 range when Stokes left the job.

What happened next was all about Edwardes and BMW, in the form of the 528 and 535i, was the obvious beneficiary.3 box IRS saloon too Conservative bs.

Carryfast:
I think it’s reasonable to say that tensile load imposed on the big end bearing cap fasteners is way out wieghed by the tensile load imposed on the head fasteners and main bearing cap fasteners.

The latter also being directly proportional to the compressive loads on the small ends and big end bearings.

A 7% leverage disadvantage is only going to make that situation much worse.

It’s a forced induction truck engine not an F1 race engine.

Fatigue is the limiting factor, so cyclic tensile stress is the enemy. If there is a nominal tensile stress, about which the cyclic loading occurs, it is even more of a problem (have a look at a Goodman diagram). Bigger fixings, or deeper thread engagement, can always be accommodated around the bores. The block and head are rectangular, while the bores are round, after all. If you want to make the big end attachment stronger, you are limited by clearance to the bottom of the liner. Also, putting bigger bolts, and extra material to accommodate them, is partly self-defeating, because the extra centrifugal force puts more stress on the big end bolts, not to mention the main cap bolts and the crank itself.

You don’t need to worry yourself about it- all of the popular engines in the last century had acceptable fatigue lives, because the engineers had done their job properly. The engines covered a range of bore/stroke ratios, because that ratio was not a limiting factor. Ask any technically-minded enthusiast which popular heavy lorry engine was the best, until 1990, and he will say Fiat V8- an oversquare design, from the same group of companies which had produced over a decade’s worth of Unic V8s- another successful oversquare engine.

Three other V8s of that period were below par for durability: both the AEC and ■■■■■■■ were botch jobs, their development compressed into impossibly short schedules by stupid MDs, out to make names for themselves. Have you read that ■■■■■■■ history text I linked ages ago? Berliet’s 1970 V8 was also a ■■■■-up, but they sorted it out by 1972, by increasing the bore, so it ended up oversquare, after which it was good for another two decades in production.

In those days, the advantages of oversquare engines- compact size, lower weight and cost- were there to be exploited, by clever designers. Nowadays, those same engineers might do something different, with the huge increase in cylinder pressures, and reduction in peak power rpm, that the last 50 years have brought. Only an idiot would suggest that the previous generation’s engineers were inferior.

[zb]
anorak:

Carryfast:
I think it’s reasonable to say that tensile load imposed on the big end bearing cap fasteners is way out wieghed by the tensile load imposed on the head fasteners and main bearing cap fasteners.

The latter also being directly proportional to the compressive loads on the small ends and big end bearings.

A 7% leverage disadvantage is only going to make that situation much worse.

It’s a forced induction truck engine not an F1 race engine.

Fatigue is the limiting factor, so cyclic tensile stress is the enemy. If there is a nominal tensile stress, about which the cyclic loading occurs, it is even more of a problem (have a look at a Goodman diagram). Bigger fixings, or deeper thread engagement, can always be accommodated around the bores. The block and head are rectangular, while the bores are round, after all. If you want to make the big end attachment stronger, you are limited by clearance to the bottom of the liner. Also, putting bigger bolts, and extra material to accommodate them, is partly self-defeating, because the extra centrifugal force puts more stress on the big end bolts, not to mention the main cap bolts and the crank itself.

You don’t need to worry yourself about it- all of the popular engines in the last century had acceptable fatigue lives, because the engineers had done their job properly. The engines covered a range of bore/stroke ratios, because that ratio was not a limiting factor. Ask any technically-minded enthusiast which popular heavy lorry engine was the best, until 1990, and he will say Fiat V8- an oversquare design, from the same group of companies which had produced over a decade’s worth of Unic V8s- another successful oversquare engine.

Three other V8s of that period were below par for durability: both the AEC and ■■■■■■■ were botch jobs, their development compressed into impossibly short schedules by stupid MDs, out to make names for themselves. Have you read that ■■■■■■■ history text I linked ages ago? Berliet’s 1970 V8 was also a ■■■■-up, but they sorted it out by 1972, by increasing the bore, so it ended up oversquare, after which it was good for another two decades in production.

In those days, the advantages of oversquare engines- compact size, lower weight and cost- were there to be exploited, by clever designers. Nowadays, those same engineers might do something different, with the huge increase in cylinder pressures, and reduction in peak power rpm, that the last 50 years have brought. Only an idiot would suggest that the previous generation’s engineers were inferior.

It seems strange why you selectively turn a blind eye to the ‘cyclic tensile’ load on the cylinder head fastenings.

The 17 litre FIAT worked.Like the 7 litre Ford did in the GT40.Who would have thought it.
But 87 lbft per litre v the Eagle’s around 100 lbft per litre and the 130 x 154 Scania 730 V8 152 lbft per litre potential tells a different story.

As does any comparison of AEC and ■■■■■■■ V8’s v the 130 mm stroke Fiat supposedly making any case for short stroke motors.

How do you make the link between more leverage and higher cylinder pressures.When by definition more leverage means more torque for the quivalent pressure or less pressure for the equivalent torque.

While less leverage compensated for by more piston area means at least more force on the con rod assembly assuming that your increase in piston area is equivalent to the stroke deficit ( not in the case of TL12 v Eagle even allowing for the TL12’s larger overall capacity ).
So bore stroke ratio 0.85 12.1 litre v 0.95 12.4 litre you end up with a 7% leverage deficit for a 5% increase in piston area which obviously has to be compensated for with higher cylinder pressure.
In addition to the 7% increase in compressive loads on the small and big ends regardless.
Then you say let’s increase specific torque by 43% to match the Eagle’s.That’s 43% x 2% cylinder pressure and 43% x 7% small and big end loads.
Good luck with that.

You won’t find many/any 0.95 bore stroke ratio, let alone oversquare, truck diesels now for a reason.That has everything to do with less cylinder pressures for equivalent output or more output for equivalent pressure and minimising compressive loads on the piston and con rod assembly.

Remind me exactly what were those respective ‘cyclic tensile’ loads you’re referring to on TL12 v Eagle at 2,000 and 1,950 rpm respectively.

That’s me done with this thread. I haven’t got the time or inclination to reply any more. CF has bored me into submission with all his claptrap.

Again i will ask the question , in fact expand it a little bit , with your wide knowledge of engine design could you explain what problems AEC engines from the 9.6 to the 12.47 litre capacitys encountered in service. With such a major design flaw there must have been many failures through the years. How did AEC become so large with such disastrous engines . Did the customers just take it on the chin
BL decided that AEC would no longer produce double deckers so as to push the Atlantean , Fleetline and Bristols they were producing . Another strange decision by Stokes and co . Leyland tried and failed for the rest of their existence to come up with a bus to succeed the Routemaster in the capital but hey ho Stokes knew best.
So come on for the umpteenth time explain what major engine failures were caused in service by this major design flaw

gingerfold:
That’s me done with this thread. I haven’t got the time or inclination to reply any more. CF has bored me into submission with all his claptrap.

More like destroyed your case and witch hunt against Stokes with facts not hearsay.

ramone:
Again i will ask the question , in fact expand it a little bit , with your wide knowledge of engine design could you explain what problems AEC engines from the 9.6 to the 12.47 litre capacitys encountered in service. With such a major design flaw there must have been many failures through the years. How did AEC become so large with such disastrous engines . Did the customers just take it on the chin
BL decided that AEC would no longer produce double deckers so as to push the Atlantean , Fleetline and Bristols they were producing . Another strange decision by Stokes and co . Leyland tried and failed for the rest of their existence to come up with a bus to succeed the Routemaster in the capital but hey ho Stokes knew best.
So come on for the umpteenth time explain what major engine failures were caused in service by this major design flaw

AEC’s ‘design flaws’ became apparent in the case of the V8 and when the TL12 ran out of talent from the point when it was put in the Roadtrain and then predictably given its P45 PDQ.When the predictable move to 38t gross was about to finally happen.
After Edwardes had used it to sabotage the launch party.

ramone:
BL decided that AEC would no longer produce double deckers so as to push the Atlantean , Fleetline and Bristols they were producing . Another strange decision by Stokes and co . Leyland tried and failed for the rest of their existence to come up with a bus to succeed the Routemaster in the capital but hey ho Stokes knew best.

According to cav, the Routemaster being taken out of production but which was still in demand 15 years later, because LT wanted to go for OMO, against the wishes of crew’s unions and passengers and maintenance staff, was a good thing.
That obviously had nothing whatesoever to do with Stokes.It had everything to do with LT Board ( which brought AEC into existence ).
Remind me when Park Royal closed in that regard and the comments made by the local MP in Hansard.Who was in charge of Leyland at that point and had been for 2 years since.

Carryfast:

ramone:
Again i will ask the question , in fact expand it a little bit , with your wide knowledge of engine design could you explain what problems AEC engines from the 9.6 to the 12.47 litre capacitys encountered in service. With such a major design flaw there must have been many failures through the years. How did AEC become so large with such disastrous engines . Did the customers just take it on the chin
BL decided that AEC would no longer produce double deckers so as to push the Atlantean , Fleetline and Bristols they were producing . Another strange decision by Stokes and co . Leyland tried and failed for the rest of their existence to come up with a bus to succeed the Routemaster in the capital but hey ho Stokes knew best.
So come on for the umpteenth time explain what major engine failures were caused in service by this major design flaw

AEC’s ‘design flaws’ became apparent in the case of the V8 and when the TL12 ran out of talent from the point when it was put in the Roadtrain and then predictably given its P45 PDQ.When the predictable move to 38t gross was about to finally happen.
After Edwardes had used it to sabotage the launch party.

total crap , Again you didn’t read the post i never mentioned the V8 , but how many times before something gets through to you , Leyland were skint they didn’t have the money to replace the tooling for the TL12 which was on its last legs apparently and they didn’t have the money to develop it further probably because they lost that much through the left wing unions that crippled the place with a gullable workforce that were more than happy to down tools at the drop of a hat .

ramone:

Carryfast:
Blah blah…

total crap , Again you didn’t read the post i never mentioned the V8 , but how many times before something gets through to you , Leyland were skint they didn’t have the money to replace the tooling for the TL12 which was on its last legs apparently and they didn’t have the money to develop it further probably because they lost that much through the left wing unions that crippled the place with a gullable workforce that were more than happy to down tools at the drop of a hat .

The negative effect of the spoilt-brat union leaders cannot be underestimated. By occupying the management’s time, and the firm’s finances, for nearly a decade, any attempts to improve the company or its products was inevitably compromised.

Carryfast:
…It seems strange why you selectively turn a blind eye to the ‘cyclic tensile’ load on the cylinder head fastenings…

I’ve mentioned them a few times. I’ve explained the difference between the dimensional constraints for the head bolts and the big end bolts. I hope I’ve entertained somebody, but it’s obvious I’m just putting fatigue damage into a keyboard with you.

[zb]
anorak:

ramone:

Carryfast:
Blah blah…

total crap , Again you didn’t read the post i never mentioned the V8 , but how many times before something gets through to you , Leyland were skint they didn’t have the money to replace the tooling for the TL12 which was on its last legs apparently and they didn’t have the money to develop it further probably because they lost that much through the left wing unions that crippled the place with a gullable workforce that were more than happy to down tools at the drop of a hat .

The negative effect of the spoilt-brat union leaders cannot be underestimated. By occupying the management’s time, and the firm’s finances, for nearly a decade, any attempts to improve the company or its products was inevitably compromised.

I’ve just started reading Edwards book and he mentions a figure of 250000 lost vehicles due to strikes in one year , a figure i think is correct but i have slept since yesterday evening. Its qute interesting that Stokes left BL in such an excellent financial state with an amicable workforce and a range of car and commercial vehicles second to none then Edwards comes and wrecks it all … i think not we all know who was in control of the wrecking ball Stokes and the red army

British Leyland under Stokes

Stokes was essentially a salesman, and while he successfully led Leyland Motor Corporation in the period up to 1968, never really got to grips with the scale and politics of British Leyland, which had now incorporated BMC, Rover, Jaguar and related commercial vehicle marques with nearly 40 factories and over 100 business units.

His efforts to bring in senior executives from competitors were only partially successful, and persistent infighting (such as the refusal of Triumph to accept the Rover V8 engine for the Stag convertible, and the discrimination against MG in allocating investment funding in favour of Triumph) whilst the inherent unprofitability of BMC sapped the competitive position of the new business. Meanwhile, Leyland Motor Corporation’s new engine policy of the late 1960s had failed, with the AEC V8 and the Rover Gas Turbine being dropped by 1973 and the Leyland 500 series fixed head engine confined to lower-powered, mainly bus applications before being dropped in 1979; the thirst of the gas turbine and the unreliability of the V8 (which had been rushed to market as an under-developed unit) and the 500-series cost sales and enabled Scania and Volvo to enter the UK market.

Both before and during his period of leadership, the British motor industry suffered from poor profitability, which went hand in hand with chronic lack of investment in production technologies and facilities. In 1975, towards the end of Stokes’ time at the helm of the company, a journalist compared the published number of employees and the published number of cars produced by various automakers, Toyota produced 36 cars per employee while Honda produced nearly 23: BLMC produced slightly more than four cars per employee in 1975 as against more than 7 for Ford’s UK plants. Factors such as the variable extent of dependence on brought-in sub-assemblies made the comparison imperfect, but the continuing lack of profitability resulting from continuing failure to invest intelligently in up to date production processes was all too real. This was a part of the background to BL’s famously awful industrial relations during the 1970s

Which translated means, Stokes ■■■■ ed BL and Edwardes came in with a new broom to clean up the shambles.

newmercman:
British Leyland under Stokes

Stokes was essentially a salesman, and while he successfully led Leyland Motor Corporation in the period up to 1968, never really got to grips with the scale and politics of British Leyland, which had now incorporated BMC, Rover, Jaguar and related commercial vehicle marques with nearly 40 factories and over 100 business units.

His efforts to bring in senior executives from competitors were only partially successful, and persistent infighting (such as the refusal of Triumph to accept the Rover V8 engine for the Stag convertible, and the discrimination against MG in allocating investment funding in favour of Triumph) whilst the inherent unprofitability of BMC sapped the competitive position of the new business. Meanwhile, Leyland Motor Corporation’s new engine policy of the late 1960s had failed, with the AEC V8 and the Rover Gas Turbine being dropped by 1973 and the Leyland 500 series fixed head engine confined to lower-powered, mainly bus applications before being dropped in 1979; the thirst of the gas turbine and the unreliability of the V8 (which had been rushed to market as an under-developed unit) and the 500-series cost sales and enabled Scania and Volvo to enter the UK market.

Both before and during his period of leadership, the British motor industry suffered from poor profitability, which went hand in hand with chronic lack of investment in production technologies and facilities. In 1975, towards the end of Stokes’ time at the helm of the company, a journalist compared the published number of employees and the published number of cars produced by various automakers, Toyota produced 36 cars per employee while Honda produced nearly 23: BLMC produced slightly more than four cars per employee in 1975 as against more than 7 for Ford’s UK plants. Factors such as the variable extent of dependence on brought-in sub-assemblies made the comparison imperfect, but the continuing lack of profitability resulting from continuing failure to invest intelligently in up to date production processes was all too real. This was a part of the background to BL’s famously awful industrial relations during the 1970s

Which translated means, Stokes [zb] ed BL and Edwardes came in with a new broom to clean up the shambles.

That is the gist I get from reading various articles to be found on the WWW. The timing says all really. Like or loath Edwards, when he joined the ship it was already washing the gunwales. Stokes referred to as a jumped up bus salesman in not so many words.

ramone:

Carryfast:
AEC’s ‘design flaws’ became apparent in the case of the V8 and when the TL12 ran out of talent from the point when it was put in the Roadtrain and then predictably given its P45 PDQ.When the predictable move to 38t gross was about to finally happen.
After Edwardes had used it to sabotage the launch party.

total crap , Again you didn’t read the post i never mentioned the V8 , but how many times before something gets through to you , Leyland were skint they didn’t have the money to replace the tooling for the TL12 which was on its last legs apparently and they didn’t have the money to develop it further probably because they lost that much through the left wing unions that crippled the place with a gullable workforce that were more than happy to down tools at the drop of a hat .

Which part is total crap.
Develop it further as in more boost and intercooling to match the specific output of the Eagle.
Oh wait.Which part of my maths is wrong.7% less leverage, 5% more piston area and you need 43% more specific torque.Where is that torque going to come from.
At what net cost in stress on the head fastenings and ends to compensate for the missing leverage.
So the tooling was supposedly knackered anyway.
Then all the more reason to knock the thing on the head and bring RR on board before launch of the Roadtrain.
So what did Edwardes do as boss of NEB and then Leyland.

It wasn’t left wing unions that replaced Rover and Triumph with a load of Jap crap, crippled the Bus division ( AEC ) by taking the Routemaster out of production 15 years too soon and flogged off RR while crippling the T45 with the TL12 no hoper.

Suggest you actually read the Hansard comments regarding Park Royal.That’s anything but condemnation of the relevant unions.
If you’ve got issues with Longbridge then close it.
So again what did Edwardes do.Oh wait he tied it around the kneck of Rover.That’ll fix it.

[zb]
anorak:
The negative effect of the spoilt-brat union leaders cannot be underestimated. By occupying the management’s time, and the firm’s finances, for nearly a decade, any attempts to improve the company or its products was inevitably compromised.

Let’s make a 32-38t truck engine with a 9.6 bus engine’s stroke then when it predictably doesn’t work let’s use the workers’ wages of the whole group to pay for the resulting damage to the firm.
Ironically if Stokes really did want to close down AEC then 1973 would have been a good time to do it the bus side already having commited commercial suicide on LT’s orders.
Bonus points if he’d taken out BMC with it.
Then follow Scammell’s lead by bringing RR on board.
Remind me what actually happened. :unamused: