ramone:
I’ve ordered the Michael Edwards book anorak it should be an interesting read
Just so long as you go by the premise that what happened between 1977-82 was on his watch.
Which includes the deal with Honda for both Rover and Triumph and the run down and closure of AEC and how the TL12 not RR Eagle ended up as the standard no choice option at launch of the Roadtrain.
But then conveniently dropped, obviously decided by 1982, during the run up to the handover to DAF.
Also seemingly the splitting of the truck and bus divisions for obvious reasons.
ramone:
I’ve ordered the Michael Edwards book anorak it should be an interesting read
Just so long as you go by the premise that what happened between 1977-82 was on his watch.
Which includes the deal with Honda for both Rover and Triumph and the run down and closure of AEC and how the TL12 not RR Eagle ended up as the standard no choice option at launch of the Roadtrain.
But then conveniently dropped, obviously decided by 1982, during the run up to the handover to DAF.
Also seemingly the splitting of the truck and bus divisions for obvious reasons.
Edwardes left in 1981 or '82. The DAF merger happened in '87, and was unexpected throughout the industry. Read a few issues of Commercial Motor. It’s all there.
As far as the design issue goes, fatigue, caused by cyclic tensile stress is the failure mode which drives the design of most of the “hard” parts of a vehicle- engine and suspension. If you don’t want to believe it, do some more reading- I will continue to say that, until you produce some calculations to show that the TL12 was limited by whatever dimension you choose. Words and generalisations are worth nothing.
[zb]
anorak:
Edwardes left in 1981 or '82. The DAF merger happened in '87, and was unexpected throughout the industry. Read a few issues of Commercial Motor. It’s all there.
As far as the design issue goes, fatigue, caused by cyclic tensile stress is the failure mode which drives the design of most of the “hard” parts of a vehicle- engine and suspension. If you don’t want to believe it, do some more reading- I will continue to say that, until you produce some calculations to show that the TL12 was limited by whatever dimension you choose. Words and generalisations are worth nothing.
Yep Edwardes’ tenure was '77-'82.
We know that the State didn’t have a 100 % shareholding in BL before 1987.
I’ve definitely seen the term DAF ‘increased’ its shareholding to a controlling 60% interest before the take over.It was obviously a take over in that regard not the lie of a merger.The government laughably being on record in hansard as stating that a ‘merger’ doesn’t need to be a 50/50 share.Who were they trying to fool.
No results for any search related to who were all the other shareholders of BL before 1987.What a surprise.
What cyclic tensile loads would equate to > 150,000 psi tensile strength of main bearing cap and cylinder head fastenings.Loads which are obviously proportional to the compressive loads on the piston/rod assembly.
Less leverage at the crank shaft obviously means more compressive load on piston and rod and more tensile load applied to cylinder head fastenings to obtain the equivalent specific torque output by a percentage equivalent to the leverage deficit in this case 7%.
Where is your evidence that the ‘cyclic tensile loads’ on the RR’s piston and rod assembly were unmanagable at 1,950 rpm max.Oh wait they clearly weren’t.
As opposed to the compressive loads on the TL12’s piston and rod assembly and resulting tensile loads on its head fastenings at almost 100 lbft per litre and 400 hp at 1,950 rpm.
You’re the one denying it you provide the evidence.
As I said there’s a reason why head and main bearing cap bolts are stronger than big end bearing cap bolts.
There is a Google group that’s worth a read. uk.rec.engines.stationary.co.uk worth looking at. Quite a bit about the evolution of Rolls Royce diesel engines and the Eagle. It will keep CF busy… there’s quite a lot of defending of his favourite engine he will need to do.
Edit to add: The Leyland Torque magazine, Edition 33, Autumn 2006, which can be read online, has a lengthy letter by someone about the TL12 and other related topics, and a comment added by a knowledgeable Leyland expert confirms all the good claims made about it, and also confirms that some problems did occur when manufacturing was transferred from Southall to Leyland because of AEC’s “incomplete” drawings…which has been mentioned before.
Also in the same edition is an article that states that when DAF took over Leyland then Leyland’s build quality was superior to that of DAF… which must have come as a huge surprise to DAF.
ramone:
I’ve ordered the Michael Edwards book anorak it should be an interesting read
Just so long as you go by the premise that what happened between 1977-82 was on his watch.
Which includes the deal with Honda for both Rover and Triumph and the run down and closure of AEC and how the TL12 not RR Eagle ended up as the standard no choice option at launch of the Roadtrain.
But then conveniently dropped, obviously decided by 1982, during the run up to the handover to DAF.
Also seemingly the splitting of the truck and bus divisions for obvious reasons.
AEC Lorry production ceased between '76 and '77 so unless Mr Edwards sat down at his new desk and ordered AEC to stop producing lorries that day you, may i suggest , could have made a mstake.It was a long term plan instigated by your hero Stokes who did the most damage to AEC
Carryfast:
…
I’ve definitely seen the term DAF ‘increased’ its shareholding to a controlling 60% interest before the take over.It was obviously a take over in that regard not the lie of a merger.The government laughably being on record in hansard as stating that a ‘merger’ doesn’t need to be a 50/50 share.Who were they trying to fool.
No results for any search related to who were all the other shareholders of BL before 1987.What a surprise.
The exchange of shares probably occurred one microsecond before the takeover, IE it was part of the mechanism of it.
Carryfast:
What cyclic tensile loads would equate to > 150,000 psi tensile strength of main bearing cap and cylinder head fastenings.Loads which are obviously proportional to the compressive loads on the piston/rod assembly.
Less leverage at the crank shaft obviously means more compressive load on piston and rod and more tensile load applied to cylinder head fastenings to obtain the equivalent specific torque output by a percentage equivalent to the leverage deficit in this case 7%.
Where is your evidence that the ‘cyclic tensile loads’ on the RR’s piston and rod assembly were unmanagable at 1,950 rpm max.Oh wait they clearly weren’t.
As opposed to the compressive loads on the TL12’s piston and rod assembly and resulting tensile loads on its head fastenings at almost 100 lbft per litre and 400 hp at 1,950 rpm.
You’re the one denying it you provide the evidence.
I’m not denying anything. I’m just telling you what the normal design criteria are. You’re the one saying you can do a better job than people 50 years ago. Do your own workings-out.
Carryfast:
As I said there’s a reason why head and main bearing cap bolts are stronger than big end bearing cap bolts.
Quote an example. Same engine, all three bolts in a list, with their yield strengths.
gingerfold:
There is a Google group that’s worth a read. uk.rec.engines.stationary.co.uk worth looking at. Quite a bit about the evolution of Rolls Royce diesel engines and the Eagle. It will keep CF busy… there’s quite a lot of defending of his favourite engine he will need to do.
Edit to add: The Leyland Torque magazine, Edition 33, Autumn 2006, which can be read online, has a lengthy letter by someone about the TL12 and other related topics, and a comment added by a knowledgeable Leyland expert confirms all the good claims made about it, and also confirms that some problems did occur when manufacturing was transferred from Southall to Leyland because of AEC’s “incomplete” drawings…which has been mentioned before.
Also in the same edition is an article that states that when DAF took over Leyland then Leyland’s build quality was superior to that of DAF… which must have come as a huge surprise to DAF.
It’s obvious that some eggs got broke on the way to developing something with a reliable almost 100 lbft per litre and 32 hp per litre at 1,950 rpm output on a typical Brit shoestring budget.
As opposed to the TL12’s 69 lbft per litre and 22 hp per litre at 2,000 rpm best shot.
The point being that the basic design contained the potential in it.
Yep I’ve also made the case that Leyland build quality was second to none.Its problems originated much higher up the chain to dodgy design and the government mandarins and bankers in charge of the funding working for the foreign competition.Anorak’s case being a perfect example of the former and denial of the latter.
ramone:
I’ve ordered the Michael Edwards book anorak it should be an interesting read
Just so long as you go by the premise that what happened between 1977-82 was on his watch.
Which includes the deal with Honda for both Rover and Triumph and the run down and closure of AEC and how the TL12 not RR Eagle ended up as the standard no choice option at launch of the Roadtrain.
But then conveniently dropped, obviously decided by 1982, during the run up to the handover to DAF.
Also seemingly the splitting of the truck and bus divisions for obvious reasons.
AEC Lorry production ceased between '76 and '77 so unless Mr Edwards sat down at his new desk and ordered AEC to stop producing lorries that day you, may i suggest , could have made a mstake.It was a long term plan instigated by your hero Stokes who did the most damage to AEC
What was the firm doing between '77-79 when it closed.Bearing in mind that Gingerfold’s timeline of run down and closure doesn’t seem to match yours.
Like the Triumph debacle didn’t see Edwardes reversing any of the supposed ‘Stokes’ decisions nor the interim MD between 75-77.
When was TL12 production transferred to Leyland ?.
Who was MD of Leyland between '75-'77.Here’s a clue it wasn’t Stokes.
Who was in charge of the NEB when the decision to take RR in house could have been made during the design stage of T45.
When was the ‘decision’ to drop the TL12 from T45 made.
The fact is there’s no evidence that Stokes ever said, let alone implemented, closure of AEC and to not maintain Triumph as a producer of performance saloon cars rivalling the BMW 5 series based on the 2.5.
Exactly which sector of the UK automotive industry, especially with any links at all to the South Eastern ‘family’ of AEC, Scammell, Bedford, were you working in between 1975-79.
Carryfast:
…
I’ve definitely seen the term DAF ‘increased’ its shareholding to a controlling 60% interest before the take over.It was obviously a take over in that regard not the lie of a merger.The government laughably being on record in hansard as stating that a ‘merger’ doesn’t need to be a 50/50 share.Who were they trying to fool.
No results for any search related to who were all the other shareholders of BL before 1987.What a surprise.
The exchange of shares probably occurred one microsecond before the takeover, IE it was part of the mechanism of it.
Carryfast:
What cyclic tensile loads would equate to > 150,000 psi tensile strength of main bearing cap and cylinder head fastenings.Loads which are obviously proportional to the compressive loads on the piston/rod assembly.
Less leverage at the crank shaft obviously means more compressive load on piston and rod and more tensile load applied to cylinder head fastenings to obtain the equivalent specific torque output by a percentage equivalent to the leverage deficit in this case 7%.
Where is your evidence that the ‘cyclic tensile loads’ on the RR’s piston and rod assembly were unmanagable at 1,950 rpm max.Oh wait they clearly weren’t.
As opposed to the compressive loads on the TL12’s piston and rod assembly and resulting tensile loads on its head fastenings at almost 100 lbft per litre and 400 hp at 1,950 rpm.
You’re the one denying it you provide the evidence.
I’m not denying anything. I’m just telling you what the normal design criteria are. You’re the one saying you can do a better job than people 50 years ago. Do your own workings-out.
Carryfast:
As I said there’s a reason why head and main bearing cap bolts are stronger than big end bearing cap bolts.
Quote an example. Same engine, all three bolts in a list, with their yield strengths.
The question was DAF shareholding ■■ in Leyland before the ‘merger’ .Also the government calling a takeover a merger including the issue of the 60% controlling interest.
Yep normal design criterea for a forced induction truck engine is all about mitigating compressive loads.Not inertial tensile loads at 2,000 rpm or less.
Are you seriously suggesting that big end bearing cap fastenings are the same tensile spec as mains and head bolts.
■■■■■■■ ISX for example same grade for both head and main caps.Nothing about big ends.
Tightening of 300 lbft + 90 degrees head and 110 lbft + 180 degrees main caps and 50 lbft + 60 degrees big end caps is also a clue.
Tensile loads aren’t an issue and if even they were a larger piston at higher engine speed isn’t going to help in that regard.
No I’m not saying that I’m better than AEC’s designers 50 years ago.I’m saying that RR’s and Volvo’s and ■■■■■■■■ and Mack’s and even to an extent Gardner’s were.I also don’t believe that most of AEC’s designs were dictated by what the designers ideally wanted but meeting location ideals and cash restraints.No one jumps from the bore stroke ratios of the 173 and 590 to the TL12 to meet any bs ‘tensile’ loading concerns.
ramone:
Because the TL12 was a 273 bhp engine so you are right but the nearest comparison would be the 265 RR then how did that compare
The 265 was actually just a derated version of an engine obviously with 400 hp and more importantly almost 100 lbft per litre potential, contained in it, for customers who only needed the lower output.
How does that compare with TL12.Especially at 38t gross.
Remind me what did the TL12 have going for it v the Eagle.
All I’m hearing so far is that the Eagle had issues running over 2,600 rpm on a race track.
Don’t remember the TL12 ever being used for racing.
Strangely enough it is the ■■■■■■■ engine which has a background in being developed for racing …in the indy 500!
The first lorry/bus ■■■■■■■ engine was maunfactured in December 1931 10 months after the first A155 AEC diesels were in service. The reason for these reaching 3800 rpm is that they were ungoverned other than for its idling speed. This is possibly likely to have led to one of the LGOC’s Regals being virtually destroyed in a very serious accident in late 1931. It was intended to produce 95 bhp at 2000rpm. and 102 @2500. The change to indirect injection, and governing to prevent overspeeding were two of the improvements introduced as this early research into automotive diesels progressed.
ramone:
I’ve ordered the Michael Edwards book anorak it should be an interesting read
Just so long as you go by the premise that what happened between 1977-82 was on his watch.
Which includes the deal with Honda for both Rover and Triumph and the run down and closure of AEC and how the TL12 not RR Eagle ended up as the standard no choice option at launch of the Roadtrain.
But then conveniently dropped, obviously decided by 1982, during the run up to the handover to DAF.
Also seemingly the splitting of the truck and bus divisions for obvious reasons.
AEC Lorry production ceased between '76 and '77 so unless Mr Edwards sat down at his new desk and ordered AEC to stop producing lorries that day you, may i suggest , could have made a mstake.It was a long term plan instigated by your hero Stokes who did the most damage to AEC
That is what I was wondering. There would have been some lead up to the AEC cessation. Reading comments on this forum and elsewhere on the Web would imply that AEC was always going to struggle in the group playing 2nd fiddle Leyland. Probably earlier decision makers than Edwards should have had the balls to consolidate all the different factions, picking the best from all. Anyone not toeing the line could have been effectively booted out.
essexpete:
That is what I was wondering. There would have been some lead up to the AEC cessation. Reading comments on this forum and elsewhere on the Web would imply that AEC was always going to struggle in the group playing 2nd fiddle Leyland. Probably earlier decision makers than Edwards should have had the balls to consolidate all the different factions, picking the best from all. Anyone not toeing the line could have been effectively booted out.
Realistically this is all about TL12 v RR Eagle and ceasing production of the Routemaster.
Scammell had already made its choice in that regard and no one wanted to see the Routemaster taken out of service
The question as to why was the Routemaster taken out of production just as demand for it was at its highest and then RR flogged off to Vickers and the T45 launched with TL12 or nothing is the smoking gun here.
That had nothing whatsoever to do with Stokes.
Leaving the question who gained from that other than DAF and Volvo.
ramone:
I’ve ordered the Michael Edwards book anorak it should be an interesting read
Just so long as you go by the premise that what happened between 1977-82 was on his watch.
Which includes the deal with Honda for both Rover and Triumph and the run down and closure of AEC and how the TL12 not RR Eagle ended up as the standard no choice option at launch of the Roadtrain.
But then conveniently dropped, obviously decided by 1982, during the run up to the handover to DAF.
Also seemingly the splitting of the truck and bus divisions for obvious reasons.
AEC Lorry production ceased between '76 and '77 so unless Mr Edwards sat down at his new desk and ordered AEC to stop producing lorries that day you, may i suggest , could have made a mstake.It was a long term plan instigated by your hero Stokes who did the most damage to AEC
What was the firm doing between '77-79 when it closed.Bearing in mind that Gingerfold’s timeline of run down and closure doesn’t seem to match yours.
Like the Triumph debacle didn’t see Edwardes reversing any of the supposed ‘Stokes’ decisions nor the interim MD between 75-77.
When was TL12 production transferred to Leyland ?.
Who was MD of Leyland between '75-'77.Here’s a clue it wasn’t Stokes.
Who was in charge of the NEB when the decision to take RR in house could have been made during the design stage of T45.
When was the ‘decision’ to drop the TL12 from T45 made.
The fact is there’s no evidence that Stokes ever said, let alone implemented, closure of AEC and to not maintain Triumph as a producer of performance saloon cars rivalling the BMW 5 series based on the 2.5.
Exactly which sector of the UK automotive industry, especially with any links at all to the South Eastern ‘family’ of AEC, Scammell, Bedford, were you working in between 1975-79.
Of course there’s factual evidence that Stokes wanted to close AEC. Do you not read what other people post? And spend six months trawling through BL board meetings, you will find all the evidence you need. As I have suggested before, please do some proper research.
In answer to one of CFs questions AEC were between 77 and 79 producing the Marathon and the Reliance until it was discontinued much to the annoyance of many loyal coach operators . Marathon prduction moved to Scammell and Guy , not sure in which order
The damage had been done long before AEC closed when Stokes was in charge.
Carryfast:
The question was DAF shareholding ■■ in Leyland before the ‘merger’ .Also the government calling a takeover a merger including the issue of the 60% controlling interest.
Yep normal design criterea for a forced induction truck engine is all about mitigating compressive loads.Not inertial tensile loads at 2,000 rpm or less.
Are you seriously suggesting that big end bearing cap fastenings are the same tensile spec as mains and head bolts.
■■■■■■■ ISX for example same grade for both head and main caps.Nothing about big ends.
Tightening of 300 lbft + 90 degrees head and 110 lbft + 180 degrees main caps and 50 lbft + 60 degrees big end caps is also a clue.
Tensile loads aren’t an issue and if even they were a larger piston at higher engine speed isn’t going to help in that regard.
No I’m not saying that I’m better than AEC’s designers 50 years ago.I’m saying that RR’s and Volvo’s and ■■■■■■■■ and Mack’s and even to an extent Gardner’s were.I also don’t believe that most of AEC’s designs were dictated by what the designers ideally wanted but meeting location ideals and cash restraints.No one jumps from the bore stroke ratios of the 173 and 590 to the TL12 to meet any bs ‘tensile’ loading concerns.
Designers consider all loads and stresses in all areas. They do not launch alehouse bragging campaigns about one bolt versus another. In the 1970s, engines of a range of bore/stroke ratios were competitive. As usual, you are trying to judge engineering from years ago, against the specifications of modern engines, ISX for example. That does not qualify you to judge the designers of AEC, Gardner or ■■■■■■■■
Torque wrench settings do not tell us much about the loads on the joints. Why don’t you calculate the in-service tensile stress of the three bolts? That is, after all, what the engineer specifying the bolts would have at the front of his mind. You could then calculate the shear stress in the threads, then specify a suitable grade of cast iron for the cylinder block, and forging steel for the rods.
gingerfold:
Of course there’s factual evidence that Stokes wanted to close AEC. Do you not read what other people post? And spend six months trawling through BL board meetings, you will find all the evidence you need. As I have suggested before, please do some proper research.
The timeline is all the evidence I need.
AEC didn’t ‘close’ until 4 YEARS AFTER Stokes had left the job of CEO.
4 years in which anyone who supposedly disagreed with the closure could have reversed the decision.
While are you seriously suggesting that Stokes hated AEC so much he maintained its production status throughout his 10 year or so tenure.
The Ryder Report made no mention of closing AEC and it’s documented that Edwardes didn’t follow its supposed recomendations.
Stokes obviously couldn’t have followed it or ditched it either way because he was out of the job at that point.You’re barking up the wrong tree.
Edwardes was the hatchet man parachuted in to sabotage and asset strip Leyland to the benefit of the foreign competition.He also obviously made sure that RR was kept a seperate entity ready for sell off as head of NEB before that.
As for BL Board meetings I’m more interested in finding out who were the minority non government shareholders in Leyland from 1977-87.My bet is DAF, or at least its financial backers, will be in there.Our government was clearly working to a pro mainland European post war economic recovery agenda at our expense.60/40 controlling interest a so called ‘merger’ yeah right.
The last thing they’d have wanted would have been a 130 x 154 AEC DAF killer messing up their plans even if AEC’s designers have had the will or the resources to make it.Just as they didn’t want the Eagle in the Roadtrain at launch.
essexpete:
That is what I was wondering. There would have been some lead up to the AEC cessation. Reading comments on this forum and elsewhere on the Web would imply that AEC was always going to struggle in the group playing 2nd fiddle Leyland. Probably earlier decision makers than Edwards should have had the balls to consolidate all the different factions, picking the best from all. Anyone not toeing the line could have been effectively booted out.
But AEC didn’t ‘cease’ until 1979.It was still operational just as before in 1975 when Stokes left the job of CEO.
It’s clear that Edwardes had more to do with AEC’s closure than Stokes.
Ironically if you wanted toeing of any lines and picking the best then the last thing you’d do is choose TL12 over RR Eagle and SD1 let alone Acclaim and 800 over 2.5 Triumph at least in the performance saloon sector.
Or take the Routemaster bus out of production in 1968.
Edwardes was in charge of RR’s fate at the point when it should have been brought in house with Leyland and Stokes had nothing to do with the decision to end Routemaster production.That decision , like its engine designs, had more to do with AEC’s suicidal management decisions dictated by the LT Bus Board that had brought the firm into existence.
Effectively AEC was toast from the moment its designers chose the 590’s stroke for the 760/TL12 as opposed to its bore stroke ratio and LT’s decision to prematurely end production of the Routemaster.
[zb]
anorak:
Designers consider all loads and stresses in all areas. They do not launch alehouse bragging campaigns about one bolt versus another. In the 1970s, engines of a range of bore/stroke ratios were competitive. As usual, you are trying to judge engineering from years ago, against the specifications of modern engines, ISX for example. That does not qualify you to judge the designers of AEC, Gardner or ■■■■■■■■
Torque wrench settings do not tell us much about the loads on the joints. Why don’t you calculate the in-service tensile stress of the three bolts? That is, after all, what the engineer specifying the bolts would have at the front of his mind. You could then calculate the shear stress in the threads, then specify a suitable grade of cast iron for the cylinder block, and forging steel for the rods.
I think it’s reasonable to say that tensile load imposed on the big end bearing cap fasteners is way out wieghed by the tensile load imposed on the head fasteners and main bearing cap fasteners.
The latter also being directly proportional to the compressive loads on the small ends and big end bearings.
A 7% leverage disadvantage is only going to make that situation much worse.
It’s a forced induction truck engine not an F1 race engine.
windrush:
The Mini never made money for BMC, that is well documented. However I worked at a BMC dealership from 1966 to 1974 and the Mini was still the best seller and we never had enough to sell. Many customers had repeat orders. However our salemen knew via the factory that it was an expensive vehicle to pruduce but had to be sold cheaply to attract the family clientelle. They were not that bad to work on either, I changed the clutch in my mates Mini in a morning at his house and I had never done one before as I was in the commercial vehicle workshop so didn’t work on cars. It was what it was, Issigonis was given the order to design a four seater car whithin a certain overall length and he did just that. Most of our mechanics ran Mini’s themselves so couldn’t have hated them that much? Regarding the Minor: William Morris never liked it and wanted the Morris Eight series E to continue in production, he himself drove a Wolseley Eight (the only one made) until his death. The Minor was of course designed to have a flat four engine originally, however the sidevalve engine from the E models was actually used as Wlliam Morris wasn’t a fan of overhead valve engines. The Minor was narrower originally as well and had to be widened, hence the raised section in the bonnet which was the the difference in width. When the Marina was unveiled, we had two in the showroom but they remained covered until a certain time on an allotted day, they were much in demand. We actually obtained cars meant for export and our fitters had to put heaters in them for the UK market to keep up with orders. Another big seller was the Wolseley 18/85 and it’s offspring, several of our mechanics and office staff bought them as they were exellent for towing their caravans.
All of this has nothing to do with engine design of course, and ‘somebody’ will say it is a load on rubbish as he has done with other posters regarding AEC etc even though they have access to the ‘written word’ at the time of closure, but I worked alongside folk who had been involved with Morris and later BMC products from the 1930’s and I also had an Uncle who spent his working life at Cowley so learned from them. Anyway I’m away from this thread now, full stop.
The Mini obviously the only product ever to reverse the laws of supply and demand.
Big demand but could only be sold for a Mars Bar and a packet of crisps.
Admittedly better than going to work on the bus and desperate dealers wanting to offload em at whatever they could get for em made for a buyers market creating its own special type of ‘demand’.Just not as we know it though high demand from reluctant buyers looking for a desperation sale who’s priority was spending money on other things not cars.Just what any car dealer needs.
Let’s tow a caravan with a front wheel drive motor.What could possibly go wrong.
The Marina 1.8 estate remind me why that was in more demand than a Maxi or an Allegro.
My comments regarding BMC were anything but dissing its workforce.
Transverse front wheel drive engine ‘design’ is what contributed to the end of BMC, Triumph and Rover.Just as the TL12 helped to finish off Leyland trucks.
Nothing to do with the work force who were second to none.
But no I’ve never subscribed to the let’s trash the whole Brit motor industry and its products just because Issigonis was out of his depth overrated and should have been give his P45 before he did irreparable damage to the firm.
Just another Leatherhead quote to suit his agenda on a similar thread.
gingerfold:
Of course there’s factual evidence that Stokes wanted to close AEC. Do you not read what other people post? And spend six months trawling through BL board meetings, you will find all the evidence you need. As I have suggested before, please do some proper research.
The timeline is all the evidence I need.
AEC didn’t ‘close’ until 4 YEARS AFTER Stokes had left the job of CEO.
4 years in which anyone who supposedly disagreed with the closure could have reversed the decision.
While are you seriously suggesting that Stokes hated AEC so much he maintained its production status throughout his 10 year or so tenure.
The Ryder Report made no mention of closing AEC and it’s documented that Edwardes didn’t follow its supposed recomendations.
Stokes obviously couldn’t have followed it or ditched it either way because he was out of the job at that point.You’re barking up the wrong tree.
Edwardes was the hatchet man parachuted in to sabotage and asset strip Leyland to the benefit of the foreign competition.He also obviously made sure that RR was kept a seperate entity ready for sell off as head of NEB before that.
As for BL Board meetings I’m more interested in finding out who were the minority non government shareholders in Leyland from 1977-87.My bet is DAF, or at least its financial backers, will be in there.Our government was clearly working to a pro mainland European post war economic recovery agenda at our expense.60/40 controlling interest a so called ‘merger’ yeah right.
The last thing they’d have wanted would have been a 130 x 154 AEC DAF killer messing up their plans even if AEC’s designers have had the will or the resources to make it.Just as they didn’t want the Eagle in the Roadtrain at launch.
So your defence of Stokes is a timeline? Evidence? Just your take on it.
If you had ever spoken to any senior AEC, Leyland, Scammell, Guy, Albion manager then they would have told you that Stokes was determined to eventually close AEC from the day he took over. No matter what arguments you make in his defence then you will always be in a minority of one.
