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anorak:
The original poster is not dead, is he?
Not as far as I know but Stokes most definitely is unless his obituary is premature. 
Carryfast:
AEC v Mercedes etc in the German and European export markets and unlike Stokes you think that a blank cheque/whatever it takes approach would have been considered worth the risk because there would have been guaranteed returns.Somehow I think the banks would have preferred to have put their money on Stokes.
AEC’s (and Leyland, Foden, Gardner’'s etc.) products were well up to competing with Mercedes etc, until 1955, when Mercedes made the decision to put the big-cab lorries down their own production lines. Investing in sales and service networks is always a good risk. Failing to keep up with product developments, in any market, is always a bad risk, long-term.
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anorak:Carryfast:
AEC v Mercedes etc in the German and European export markets and unlike Stokes you think that a blank cheque/whatever it takes approach would have been considered worth the risk because there would have been guaranteed returns.Somehow I think the banks would have preferred to have put their money on Stokes.
AEC’s (and Leyland, Foden, Gardner’'s etc.) products were well up to competing with Mercedes etc, until 1955, when Mercedes made the decision to put the big-cab lorries down their own production lines. Investing in sales and service networks is always a good risk. Failing to keep up with product developments, in any market, is always a bad risk, long-term.
AEC had already lost the battle before 1955.
youtube.com/watch?v=h9epS0xQeak
Thanks for the links to the Krupp video/photos. Those lorries certainly looked the part, with powerful engines and sleeper cabs. Being early '50s, this would have been just before the wholesale shift to forward control. At the time, I would guess that, apart from the cab, a British lorry was well up to the standard of engineering in these German vehicles.
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anorak:
Thanks for the links to the Krupp video/photos. Those lorries certainly looked the part, with powerful engines and sleeper cabs. Being early '50s, this would have been just before the wholesale shift to forward control. At the time, I would guess that, apart from the cab, a British lorry was well up to the standard of engineering in these German vehicles.
I don’t think so.So what would you have in the armoury,assuming that I’m a German customer about to go for a few Titans,to make me change my mind.That’s even before taking into account that we’ve probably recently been facing each other in a war that I’m really zb’d off about losing to the British and now you’re telling me to put my own out of work to give yours the work instead and it’s not like I’ve got an established local support network for British engineering v German either.
This is probably what any British banker would be saying at the time before he gives you the money. 
British commercial vehicle builders had toeholds in most Continental markets. Look on the foreign forums. Their failure was not to expand their sales/service networks in Europe, instead taking the easy option- it’s all there in black and white, in Stokes’ obituary. If they had done this, they would have been there to supply the boom in demand for lorries as elaborate the Krupp in the video. These customers would have provided them with the impetus to keep pace with progress and develop more driver-friendly vehicles. The extra sales would have provided the profits to invest in necessary R&D. It is what all the successful makers did. No excuses.
The Germans had their own home grown truck industry anyway, where would they be without the IFA, the Faun and the Setra bus from Kassbohrer. Bussing from Borgward. The Cologne built Ford efFKay was a common sight. I had to fool the auto censor as it doesn’t recognise the model name 
But once again a thread has been derailed by the master of derailment.
British lorries of the 50’s
We had the underfloor engined Albion Claymore, the Alvis before Rover took control, Guy before Jaguar took control, Bristol before BMC took control, Thorneycroft to AEC, Maudsley before AEC, AEC to BLMC does anyone see a pattern emerging?
Hi Wheelnut, alongside the vehicles you mention there was plenty of impressive stuff, some of it well-regarded in the difficult Continental markets. There is a picture of a Foden eight-wheeler on the Chris Hodge site (I can’t find it), at a show in Belgium in 1957. It has a locally-coachbuilt cab and it looks the business. Ok, by this time most Continental makers were well on the road to mass-producing such vehicles (pressed steel cabs=high volume), but it shows that GB could just about compete, at the time. I don’t think the Belgian market was really the place for eight-wheel rigids at the time, though I may be corrected.
Wheel Nut:
The Germans had their own home grown truck industry anyway, where would they be without the IFA, the Faun and the Setra bus from Kassbohrer. Bussing from Borgward. The Cologne built Ford efFKay was a common sight. I had to fool the auto censor as it doesn’t recognise the model name
But once again a thread has been derailed by the master of derailment.
British lorries of the 50’s
We had the underfloor engined Albion Claymore, the Alvis before Rover took control, Guy before Jaguar took control, Bristol before BMC took control, Thorneycroft to AEC, Maudsley before AEC, AEC to BLMC does anyone see a pattern emerging?
It’s not a case of derailment it’s one of explaining the bleedin obvious that it wasn’t Stokes’ fault.There’s no way that anyone could have made a silk ■■■■■ out of the sows ear of the British truck manufacturing industry which was crippled by the backward demands of it’s domestic customer base and even if he could there’s still no way that post war Germany was ever going to throw it’s economic recovery away on importing products from Britain when it could make it’s own better ones for itself anyway.
I asked zb anorak what great selling point of the AEC types available at the time he was going to give me,as a hypothetical German customer,which would have convinced me to change my mind from buying something like the home built Titan to an AEC instead.The fact that even 20-25 years later AEC and other British manufacturers were still putting out products like day cabbed Atkis and the zb Ergo cabbed heaps with engine outputs of around the same or even less says everything about how badly the British industry was crippled by the demands of the domestic market.
There’s no way that AEC could have expanded it’s sales network in markets like Germany with the products that it had at it’s disposal to sell at the time in question or even later because it wouldn’t have been as easy as just bolting a better cab onto a zb Mammoth chassis.That’s even assuming that the customers in those markets could even be convinced to buy British not German at all regardless of the inferiority or otherwise of something like a Mammoth compared to a Titan during the early 1950’s.
The fact is if Jaguar couldn’t take the land of Autobahns by storm between the 1950’s-1970’s then AEC sure as hell wasn’t going to take the German truck market away from the domestic German truck manufacturers either.
As for Thornycroft.In my experience they were the cheap and nasty option for the domestic market with around a10% exception to that rule of just two regional British airports that followed the demands of the export markets instead.
It was the export markets that knew,and were prepared to buy,better.But without an equally strong,if not stronger,domestic market for the same products the domestic manufacturers were all zb’d anyway. 
British lorries circa 1950 were well up to the mark. They were that good that Scania and DAF were using Leyland as a consultancy. Mercedes did not even use direct injection until 1964, while DI Gardner engines were in demand all over the world, as were Leyland vehicles. It was the failure to capitalise on this sound engineering base that allowed the Continentals to overtake, starting in 1955 with the Mercedes LP cab, shown above. Even the writer of Stokes’ obituary could see that his approach to marketing was cowardly and short-sighted.
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anorak:
British lorries circa 1950 were well up to the mark. They were that good that Scania and DAF were using Leyland as a consultancy. Mercedes did not even use direct injection until 1964, while DI Gardner engines were in demand all over the world, as were Leyland vehicles. It was the failure to capitalise on this sound engineering base that allowed the Continentals to overtake, starting in 1955 with the Mercedes LP cab, shown above. Even the writer of Stokes’ obituary could see that his approach to marketing was cowardly and short-sighted.
The fact is regardless of the so called ‘technical superiority of a Gardner’ 
the German customers were calling for something that could provide more than 200 hp with a reasonably comfortable cab before 1955 in which case what was it in the AEC product list that you’re intending to provide.That’s assuming that the customer wants to give you the order anyway rather than give it to his ex kameraden who need the work to create the forthcoming German economic miracle.
Stokes’ approach to marketing was absolutely spot on the mark bearing in mind all the angles he was faced with of an outdated almost finished British truck manufacturing industry that had been crippled years before by the British government’s post war economic rebuilding policies and the backward demands of the domestic customer base leading to a 10-20 year lag in development compared to the market conditions that applied in the domestic markets of firms like Mercedes etc.
Whatever the so called advantages of the Gardner the thing was only putting out around 180 hp,in six cylinder form,and 250 hp in eight cylinder form,in the early-mid 1970’s let alone what it,or AEC’s engines,could provide in the early 1950’s.Which gives some idea of the poisoned chalice that Stokes had been given and that he was stupid enough to accept.
You have got your dates out of sync a bit. 200bhp was the standard in 1960, but in the early 50s, less than 150bhp was the norm, and Leyland et al were up to speed then. Check the books.
Stokes was given the export sales job in 1946- a rich opportunity for him and his company. He poisoned his own chalice, and those of his workmates, by covering himself in glory, going for the easy sales. I don’t know why I’m repeating this- it’s all there in the Telegraph article. There is no need to twist it.
Carryfast, I’ll give you one thing…you’ve livened this thread up
Now, that being so, as usual you’ve done it by being WRONG
AEC and Scammell were a very different beast to ERF and Foden, they were assemblers, AEC and Scammell were manufacturers, Foden had a go with their own engines and gearboxes, but everything else with the exception of some suspension trickery at ERF was bought in and/or copied, AEC and Scammell were innovators, both were castrated by your hero Mr Stokes and eventually damaged beyond repair
You also mention Mercedes looking after its home market and all the usual old flannnel straight from the Henry Ford school of vehicle sales, but Mercedes Benz is the largest truck manufacturer in Europe, so they did a lot more than looking after the needs of Fritz and Helmut, they EXPORTED, look at number two in European sales, Daf, not really a huge market Holland, even if you count Belgium and Luxembourg, they got big by exporting to European Countries, the same applies to Volvo, Sweden and Scandinavia in general may have good brand loyalty, but the UK was Volvos largest market for many years, see the pattern, it’s all about EXPORT SALES
Hi Newmercman. A small amendment to your post- DAF is number one in tractor unit sales in Europe. commercialmotor.com/transpor … -in-europe
The beginnings of Volvo and DAF’s success in the UK show how it should be done- as well as having a good product, they started by offering superior service. I guess they invested enough in dealerships, parts stocks, breakdown vans etc. to cater for a larger vehicle population than existed initially, anticipating growth. Consequently, the first operators who bought those vehicles were “spoiled” for a period, and this paid off in the makers’ reputations. Of course it was a loss leader, but it was a better long-term investment than discounting their way into the market, like the French and Italian makes.
This is only my interpretation of what I have read over the years, but it is what I believe our lorry builders should have done in Europe, when their products were amongst the best, pre-1955. The demand for luxury cabs, then more powerful engines, would have come loud and clear from their new, growing, customer base. This would have urged them to develop such products- lorries that would, eventually, have become the home-market competition for the likes of the F88.
Daf may have the edge on tractor units, but Merc are No1 on total sales over 7.49t in Europe, in fact parent company Daimler AG has under its umbrella the leader in sales in Europe (Merc) North America (Freightliner) and Asia (Mitsubishi Fuso) They also have strong sales in South America and Australia/New Zealand. All this from a company that was all but destroyed in the 40s when that little Austrian dude got the country in a spot of bother
I’m on your side, our friend Carryfast is a bit delusional. Daf used Leyland engines in its early models and they went on to great success from the developments they made to it. Compare an early 60s Daf to an Ergo cab Beaver or Mandator and not many drivers would’ve taken the Daf, it was development that put Daf where they are today (not to mention a huge bail out from the Dutch Government and investment by Paccar) If Stokes and his cronies hadn’t starved AEC and Scammell of money thay could and would have done similar, they showed the rest how to do, only the rest were allowed to take it to the next level , they, unfortunately, were not 
I used to consider it inexplicable that Leyland should have scuppered AEC’s liaison with Willeme, and its promise of a route into European sales- until I read that concise but illuminating obituary of Donald Stokes. It was as if he killed it in order that his earlier argument, in favour of avoiding European markets, would not be proved wrong. Either that or a desire not to see the London boys succeed where his own firm had not.
I thought it equally odd that, within the space of five years, Leyland Motors should design and put up expensive press tools for two cabs, aimed almost deliberately shy of the growing European markets, some of which loved Leyland’s products. I have seen pictures of Spanish (or Portuguese) Leylands with locally-built cabs- such was their devotion to the marque that they actually copied the Ergo styling, but made the thing bigger. Stokes’ whole strategy seemed to be the dogmatic justification of his earlier opinions and decisions.
Merc were still offering non turbo engines well in to the 80s. And I believe the earlier models such as the 1418 and 1924 were fondly known as ■■■■ atkinsons.
newmercman:
Carryfast, I’ll give you one thing…you’ve livened this thread upNow, that being so, as usual you’ve done it by being WRONG
AEC and Scammell were a very different beast to ERF and Foden, they were assemblers, AEC and Scammell were manufacturers, Foden had a go with their own engines and gearboxes, but everything else with the exception of some suspension trickery at ERF was bought in and/or copied, AEC and Scammell were innovators, both were castrated by your hero Mr Stokes and eventually damaged beyond repair
You also mention Mercedes looking after its home market and all the usual old flannnel straight from the Henry Ford school of vehicle sales, but Mercedes Benz is the largest truck manufacturer in Europe, so they did a lot more than looking after the needs of Fritz and Helmut, they EXPORTED, look at number two in European sales, Daf, not really a huge market Holland, even if you count Belgium and Luxembourg, they got big by exporting to European Countries, the same applies to Volvo, Sweden and Scandinavia in general may have good brand loyalty, but the UK was Volvos largest market for many years, see the pattern, it’s all about EXPORT SALES
I’m certainly not wrong because history proves me right.AEC and Scammell were both crippled by exactly the same issues that zb’d up the domestic industry as a whole regardless of wether it was all in house production or not.There could be no real innovation by the domestic manufacturers because contrary to your ideas there’s no way that any manufacturer,in any part of the world,has ever based it’s future on just mainly export sales,or built products for export that weren’t based on the same products that sell in the domestic market.With one exception to that rule which I’ve got first hand experience of because I worked there remember .To my knowledge that factory closed down before Leyland did.
The reason for that,as far as I can tell,was because of the impossibility of being able to compete with the American and German competition in the long term which,as I’ve said,had the advantage of much stronger domestic economies,therefore,unlike the British manufacturers,they could cope with paying developed economy wage and cost levels and had the benefit of a much stronger domestic market customer base and domestic customer loyalty,than we had as exporters into those markets.
However the facts show that it was more the loss of the domestic market,to foreign competition,that killed the British truck manufacturing industry than the loss of export markets.
As for assembly operations the US truck manufacturing industry would have been non existent by now if it hadn’t have been for large scale assembly operations using outside specialist engine,driveline,and suspension suppliers and I think that rule probably even applies to the wagon that you’re driving now 
.
While Scammell would have been far less able to survive as long as it did,or to produce products like the Commander,or the Crusader,without use of major componentry bought from outside specialist British and/or American suppliers.
But for your argument to hold water it would all have had to have been Stokes’ fault that ‘every’ British manufacturer went under not just the Leyland Group and all the British truck manufacturers needed to do was to just build exactly the same type of wagons that the European and US customers were demanding from the early 1950’s onward (decent sleeper cabbed 200 hp+ trucks) and forget all about the domestic market completely and just rely on exports for their survival.While paying their workforces German and American type wages.But the strength of the European and American truck manufactruring industries,wasn’t based on the differences in the strength of their domestic economies and the type of demands,of the customer base,in their their respective domestic markets,compared to those that existed here. 
Yeah right.
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anorak:
I used to consider it inexplicable that Leyland should have scuppered AEC’s liaison with Willeme, and its promise of a route into European sales- until I read that concise but illuminating obituary of Donald Stokes. It was as if he killed it in order that his earlier argument, in favour of avoiding European markets, would not be proved wrong. Either that or a desire not to see the London boys succeed where his own firm had not.
What happened to Willeme .You’ve guessed it a now non existent firm that used bought in American componentry like Detroit engines just like Scammell.
As for the argument that us Southerners can put together a decent wagon and know a bit about the truck manufacturing industry on that issue you’d be right.
As unlikely as this sounds, Carryfast my old china, you’re answering questions that weren’t asked in the first place, no big problem, free speach and all, but I am rather disappointed with you, we’re on page 3 already and you’ve not mentioned the TM yet, come on man, pull yourself together
Now back on topic, sort of. My opinion is that AEC & Scammell would’ve been able to compete on every level with any of the competition, had they had the same backing. The products put out by the foreigners were, to start with, inferior, but then the engineers, marketing department, management team and the bloke that cleaned the kharzi all pulled together in the same direction, over here everyone was at war with each other and that’s just in house, you start to talk about outside suppliers and their complete lack of cohesion in the supply chain, combine the elements together and you get the flustercuck that was the British Vehichle Manufacturing Industry