So it could’ve been an 8V92 then!
It makes me wonder whether Detroit did a bit of a you-scratch-my-back-I’ll-scratch-yours deal with ■■■■■■■ behind the scenes, possibly to protect some (hidden to us) interests on the domestic (US) market. Mere speculation and conspiracy theorising, of course. Robert
newmercman:
So it could’ve been an 8V92 then!
Probably was. 
The clue is that other French TM I posted- it had a “310 V8” badge on it, in a similar style to your 340 one. The 8v71 was about 310bhp DIN, so the badges on French TMs were probably DIN , if there was any consistency at all. If so, it was either a version of the 92TT (see below), a 92TTA or even a 71T.
I note that both the 1977 Turin report and Monsieur Saviem’s recollection of the 1978 Show refer to an 8v92TT, not a TTA. The '77 report says 365bhp DIN, M. Saviem says 380bhp. Can anyone find spec. sheets for those engines? Bedford’s marketing of the 92 series seems lamentable- different versions into different markets, seemingly with little fanfare. It seems that Bedford was waiting for the TA version (386/395/400), before making a proper fuss about it. Oddly enough, the low-revs TTA version only appears in the GB brochure as a 6 cylinder. The 8v92TTA looks to be ideal for late '70s Europe.
To my humble opinion users of DD were more and more ‘convinced’ that 2-cycle diesels were not the future
for the automotive sector. More than that ■■■■■■■ did not really need the automotive market as they had
a significant role as a supplier (not a truck-manufacturer) with more disciplines to serve and make their
world wide turnover. Mid 80’s DD’s market share for US-trucks declined into a sober 5% and by the time
that Roger Penske (race-driver and then already with a huge spin-off in the automotive sector) took over
the DD-company in 1988 that market share was only 3%…so the era of 1977 towards mid 80’s showed
a desinterest on DD’s products. In 2000 Daimler Chrysler took over the lot
An attempt with the documentation now on hand but not my favourite cup of tea coming out a ■■■■■■■ nest 
.
.
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Regarding power outputs, ERF-C’s scans show up this little morsel of uncertainty:
Silver Series- 445bhp to SAE J1349. Inlet air temperature 25 deg C and pressure 99kPa.
8v92TA- 435bhp to SAE. Inlet air temperature 29.4 deg C and pressure 98kPa. This is the same graph as the brochure I quoted above, which says the power is “gross”.
The inlet air is about 2.5% more dense in the Silver engine than the TA. That’s a 2.5% advantage for the “net” standard versus the “gross”, before any of the ancillaries are added to the load. The graphs say the power is guaranteed within 5%. The numbers are just nominals, that is all they are. The SAE test standards appear to be at conflict with each other and the specification sheets seem to be written by salesmen, rather than test-house technicians.
.
Evening Gentlemen;
Bit of a hoot this thread!
ERF-Continental has neatly summerised the final demise of the V Detroit. It was an engine from the past (over 30 years old when put into the first TMs in 74), totally uneconomic post the oil crisis, loosing market share in massive proportions in its domestic market, unable to meet the introduction of anti pollution regulations, and as ERF-C says “rescued” by Roger Penske from General Motors. Boy, that man was a “go getter”,He built Penske Leasing into the USAs top flight from zero. Went on to command enormous respect in the market place.
Anorak, the more you study Detroit specific outputs for given engine types…the more confusing it becomes. In Milan we finally gave up trying to work out which power output related to any vehicles that we bought off operators…whatever the engine plate said could not be relied on. But without exception even well worn those Detroit TMs were a nice lorry to drive, sounded great, and cog swopping, either Spicer, of Eaton, was a delight…but they had no residual value at all.
I am afraid that I cannot allow Carryfasts simplistic view on the demise of Bedford, and his continual apportionment of blame for any demise upon "the UK Management, bosses, ad nauseum, to remain unchallenged…for it is so far from the truth to be an insult to so many who worked for Bedford in the World market place.
When Bedford ceased production in 1986 the company had produced over 2 million units, over 60% of these had earned the UK revenue as exports.
General Motors was an automobile orientated company. To work for the Truck business was not the path to the “executive wash room” in Detroit.
General Motors employed a senior Executive rotation programme, which ensured that for any given role the maximum term in that role was 36/48 months. Executives were crossing paths constantly, and often “re-aligning” their predesors work!
The factories in Dunstable, Luton, Portugal,produced all Bedford vehicles for the world market except for GMs USA, and South America In 1976 in excess of 100,000 units.
A decision from Detroit removed UK manufactured Bedford product from the markets in Asia, the far East, and Australia, in favour of Bedford “branded” Isuzu product. The net effect was to remove 2400 units from UK production per week in 1979.
The African market collapsed for Bedford due to the unhealthy economic state of the countries involved. This coupled to increased pressure in Europe in the middle weight market from Mercedes Group, and Fiat.( By 78, Fiat had increased its business in Belgium by 39%, Germany by 31%, and Holland by 22% over its 76 figures), and arch rivals Ford.
The TK range, a 1959 design was revamped on a very low budget to become the TL, and the TM was introduced into the European market place And GM/Bedford had some positive results
.
1983 General Motors took the decision to stay in Trucks, and created a stand alone division from the automobile business, The World Truck Program, based in Pontiac Michigan. Despite anticipated world sales volume of circ 400,000 units, compared with a manufacturing capacity in excess of 600,000 units.
1984, in the UK there was increasing concern regarding the future of UK lorry building, both for the domestic and World markets. Norman Tebbit, Trade and Industry Minister called a meeting of the three major players to ascertain if any degree of collaboration could take place , in view of the worst market for over 30 years. Ford, Bedford, and Leyland attended.
Ford were already advanced with the Iveco collaboration, Bedford, under its World Truck Program guise, had Senior Executive Director, Bob Price, already knocking on European manufacturers doors. Talks were well underway with ENASA in Spain. Leyland were open to offers, the UK domestic market share of imported vehicles in the 28 tonne sector stood at 50%!
ENASA, via the Spanish Government closed its doors on GM. But every cloud has a silver lining…Germanys MAN was brought to its knees financially with a disasterous bad debt in Iraq concerning the supply of 11000 units. The loss was over 500 million DMs, (around 128m pounds in 85). Bob Price and his team were at their door, and it was wide open! So open that at the Frankfurt show it was an open secret…everyone was agog…for the potential MAN/GM combine would be a massive grouping easily a rival to Ford/Iveco, in the World market place.
So why did it not happen? Mercedes, already having rationalised its manufacturing operation, and brutal in its attack on the European market place, saw the potential GM/MAN combine having an easy 11% of the total market. That would cause them serious problems. Their strategy, to bale out MAN, (which could not be done under EU regulations legally).But MB could not tolerate another Iveco/Ford, or RVI Group in competition.
Warner Breitschwerdt, Chairman of Daimler Benz, authorised the purchase of the GHH Group, (Gutehoffnunghutte) for the equivalent of 170 m pounds, GHH of course owned MAN, and the deal was completed via the GHH subsidiary MTU-Hi Tech.Part of the deal included MB buying 350m DM of components from MAN, axles engines, sheet metal etc per year.
So what of GM search for a partner? Another Silver Lining…Paul Channon on behalf of HM Government asks Paul Tosch, newly arrived at Bedford, to talk to Les Wharton of Leyland/Land Rover/Freight Rover…and see if there is a deal to be done!
And of course there was…until the media got hold of it…and the in fighting began at Leyland Andrews with responsibility for Land Rover was trying to organise a management buy out, thus he was precluded from the GM/Leyland negotiations…then Freight Rover was out…then in, (Bedford needed a new van…then the jingoistic bleats to keep land Rover British started…and that was the end of it all.
Channon took fright, and handed the whole mess back to the Leyland Board…Land Rover was out, then 50% in, then a supervisory board was proposed…then everyone went into a corner and sulked!! No one on the Leyland side knew what they could actually do, and the GM people simply could not believe what was happening!
No one in Bedford, or Leyland could believe how a good potential marriage could have been reduced to rubble by the political mishandling. But it was, and in 1986, General Motors no 4 Executive, Bob Stempel signed the document that closed Bedford forever.
That it could have worked, or not, is open to conjecture, and some fascinating scenarios. But let no one reduce the demise of Bedford, (or Leyland), to such simplistic terms as fitting the wrong engine! That simply shows a complete lack of awareness of the world of business.
No, I never had anything to do with Bedford, or Leyland, I am just an Englishman, sad to see the work of so many of my countrymen dismissed and rubbished.
I shall treat myself to a large Bollinger, to cheer me up,
Cheerio for now.
Saviem:
Evening Gentlemen;Bit of a hoot this thread!
ERF-Continental has neatly summerised the final demise of the V Detroit. It was an engine from the past (over 30 years old when put into the first TMs in 74), totally uneconomic post the oil crisis, loosing market share in massive proportions in its domestic market, unable to meet the introduction of anti pollution regulations, and as ERF-C says “rescued” by Roger Penske from General Motors. Boy, that man was a “go getter”,He built Penske Leasing into the USAs top flight from zero. Went on to command enormous respect in the market place.
Anorak, the more you study Detroit specific outputs for given engine types…the more confusing it becomes. In Milan we finally gave up trying to work out which power output related to any vehicles that we bought off operators…whatever the engine plate said could not be relied on. But without exception even well worn those Detroit TMs were a nice lorry to drive, sounded great, and cog swopping, either Spicer, of Eaton, was a delight…but they had no residual value at all.
I am afraid that I cannot allow Carryfasts simplistic view on the demise of Bedford, and his continual apportionment of blame for any demise upon "the UK Management, bosses, ad nauseum, to remain unchallenged…for it is so far from the truth to be an insult to so many who worked for Bedford in the World market place.
When Bedford ceased production in 1986 the company had produced over 2 million units, over 60% of these had earned the UK revenue as exports.
General Motors was an automobile orientated company. To work for the Truck business was not the path to the “executive wash room” in Detroit.
General Motors employed a senior Executive rotation programme, which ensured that for any given role the maximum term in that role was 36/48 months. Executives were crossing paths constantly, and often “re-aligning” their predesors work!
The factories in Dunstable, Luton, Portugal,produced all Bedford vehicles for the world market except for GMs USA, and South America In 1976 in excess of 100,000 units.
A decision from Detroit removed UK manufactured Bedford product from the markets in Asia, the far East, and Australia, in favour of Bedford “branded” Isuzu product. The net effect was to remove 2400 units from UK production per week in 1979.
The African market collapsed for Bedford due to the unhealthy economic state of the countries involved. This coupled to increased pressure in Europe in the middle weight market from Mercedes Group, and Fiat.( By 78, Fiat had increased its business in Belgium by 39%, Germany by 31%, and Holland by 22% over its 76 figures), and arch rivals Ford.
The TK range, a 1959 design was revamped on a very low budget to become the TL, and the TM was introduced into the European market place And GM/Bedford had some positive results
.
1983 General Motors took the decision to stay in Trucks, and created a stand alone division from the automobile business, The World Truck Program, based in Pontiac Michigan. Despite anticipated world sales volume of circ 400,000 units, compared with a manufacturing capacity in excess of 600,000 units.1984, in the UK there was increasing concern regarding the future of UK lorry building, both for the domestic and World markets. Norman Tebbit, Trade and Industry Minister called a meeting of the three major players to ascertain if any degree of collaboration could take place , in view of the worst market for over 30 years. Ford, Bedford, and Leyland attended.
Ford were already advanced with the Iveco collaboration, Bedford, under its World Truck Program guise, had Senior Executive Director, Bob Price, already knocking on European manufacturers doors. Talks were well underway with ENASA in Spain. Leyland were open to offers, the UK domestic market share of imported vehicles in the 28 tonne sector stood at 50%!
ENASA, via the Spanish Government closed its doors on GM. But every cloud has a silver lining…Germany
s MAN was brought to its knees financially with a disasterous bad debt in Iraq concerning the supply of 11000 units. The loss was over 500 million DMs, (around 128m pounds in85). Bob Price and his team were at their door, and it was wide open! So open that at the Frankfurt show it was an open secret…everyone was agog…for the potential MAN/GM combine would be a massive grouping easily a rival to Ford/Iveco, in the World market place.So why did it not happen? Mercedes, already having rationalised its manufacturing operation, and brutal in its attack on the European market place, saw the potential GM/MAN combine having an easy 11% of the total market. That would cause them serious problems. Their strategy, to bale out MAN, (which could not be done under EU regulations legally).But MB could not tolerate another Iveco/Ford, or RVI Group in competition.
Warner Breitschwerdt, Chairman of Daimler Benz, authorised the purchase of the GHH Group, (Gutehoffnunghutte) for the equivalent of 170 m pounds, GHH of course owned MAN, and the deal was completed via the GHH subsidiary MTU-Hi Tech.Part of the deal included MB buying 350m DM of components from MAN, axles engines, sheet metal etc per year.
So what of GM search for a partner? Another Silver Lining…Paul Channon on behalf of HM Government asks Paul Tosch, newly arrived at Bedford, to talk to Les Wharton of Leyland/Land Rover/Freight Rover…and see if there is a deal to be done!
And of course there was…until the media got hold of it…and the in fighting began at Leyland Andrews with responsibility for Land Rover was trying to organise a management buy out, thus he was precluded from the GM/Leyland negotiations…then Freight Rover was out…then in, (Bedford needed a new van…then the jingoistic bleats to keep land Rover British started…and that was the end of it all.
Channon took fright, and handed the whole mess back to the Leyland Board…Land Rover was out, then 50% in, then a supervisory board was proposed…then everyone went into a corner and sulked!! No one on the Leyland side knew what they could actually do, and the GM people simply could not believe what was happening!
No one in Bedford, or Leyland could believe how a good potential marriage could have been reduced to rubble by the political mishandling. But it was, and in 1986, General Motors no 4 Executive, Bob Stempel signed the document that closed Bedford forever.
That it could have worked, or not, is open to conjecture, and some fascinating scenarios. But let no one reduce the demise of Bedford, (or Leyland), to such simplistic terms as fitting the wrong engine! That simply shows a complete lack of awareness of the world of business.
No, I never had anything to do with Bedford, or Leyland, I am just an Englishman, sad to see the work of so many of my countrymen dismissed and rubbished.
I shall treat myself to a large Bollinger, to cheer me up,
Cheerio for now.
.
And that my pedigree chums is the difference between someone who knows their stuff and Carryfast [emoji38]
newmercman:
And that my pedigree chums is the difference between someone who knows their stuff and Carryfast [emoji38]
To be fair it isn’t me who blew more than £50,000,000 in US provided cash by 1970’s terms,on a truck project which lasted at best 12 years before bringing the whole firm down.In large part because they didn’t understand the essential differences in efficiency between a 6/8v71N v a turbo 6/8v92.Let alone then fitting the thing with a rival’s less powerful motor when the US guvnor,who provided the money and who was paying the bills,had said in house only.Because using in house is not only cheaper,it also doesn’t help our major competitor and it’s better. 
Superb overview in both depth and width Monsieur Saviem! You deserved a large Bollinger after writing!
At least Detroit Diesel (Allison) showed a lot of ‘confidence’ regarding the 2-cycle principle amongst an
era and atmosphere where Buda, Caterpillar, ■■■■■■■■ Hercules, Mack and others sticked to 4-cycle.
In 1934 during the 500 Indianapolis (originin 1911) ■■■■■■■ participated with both 2- and 4-cycle diesels
and ever since no 2-cycle diesels were manufactured. Number 6 (4-cycle) is nowadays in the museum.
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Look out CF! Here comes the Blitz!! Robert
