Evening all, great contributions from everyone, windrush, cav551, superb inside, (literaly) real working knowledge. gingerfold has probably more knowledge of Gardner, the company, based on close and valid research, than anyone outside of the actual business. Bewick, and others have put their money down and run them, 6&8 cylinders, in whatever chassis they came, and know first hand the success or failure in operation of these engines. cav & windrushes point about installation being critical to success in operation is a very valid one indeed, and often overlooked in the heat of argument as to the quality of the product, or its manufacturer.
In the early pioneering days of diesel engined vehicles, late 1920s to early 1930s, you had MAN, Daimler Benz, ■■■■■■■■ AEC, Dennis, Saurer, Leyland,an Gardner. The only engines with direct injection into piston cavity combustion chambers being ■■■■■■■■ Gardner and Leyland. From those early days Gardners fuel economy, coupled to light installed weight,and dependable longevity, was the bench mark for all others to meet, let alone exceed.
That Gardner was ill served by some of its managements decisions is without doubt, particularly regarding control of labour cost inflation, resulting in the long protracted strike , from which it never really recovered. In todays world the economic argument put to a more market aware and realistic Union, would perhaps have resulted in a less damaging course of action. But that is supposition based on hindsight, and ignores the apparent intransigent management stance.
The market changed, a premium price for a (reputation wise), premium product, that would last for many, many years, did not hold in the 80s. Larger groupings, and centralised purchasing functions of transport companies, the rapid change from outright acquisition, to hire for a defined period, (encouraged by the rush to “off balance sheet funding”, encouraged by the introduction of SSAP21 Standard Accounting Practice). The consequential short first ownership life, coupled with the indefinable damage caused by Gardners previous dismissive attitude towards its customer base, both vehicle assemblers, and end users, did them no favours in the domestic market place. And Gardners aparent lack of realisation that its European licence builders, Bernard in France, and Kromhout in the low countries could have helped provide product to supplement their first supply problems in the late 60s, early 70s did not help.
Then along came Hawker Siddley, lots of investment, at the wrong time, and perhaps in the wrong direction, but they saw Gardner as undoubtedly the Jewel in their crown. The world was moving away from Gardners naturally aspirated designs, true just bolting on a Turbocharger could , and did bring its own problems, in France Willeme had all but lost its premium reputation by turbocharging its 13.45litre straight 6 586TC from 190 to 255hp, with the consequential unreliability, (and forced the adoption of AEC engines). The LXC 10.45 litre gave 201 BS hp, but the market required 200hp plus, (and the LXC had real quality problems). The 6 LXDT, 12.7litres giving initially 270hp, was uprated to 290 hp, and I believe intercooled versions were tried at 310hp by Perkins. But the confusion in marketing remained with Perkins, for at the same time they had the 15.5litre 6LYT. Right at the start of its life, in the mid eighties with a power output of 350hp, but designed to give 500,hp plus, with a net installed weight lighter than any 300hp engine of whatever swept volume at the time. Remember Volvo were yet preparing to launch their 16litre engine. But where would this new engine be produced, Patricroft? but part was closed to save money. I understand that plans were mooted to assemble engines at Bus Engineering at Chiswick! Did this ever happen, and can our more knowlegeable contributors fill in the final demise of Gardner, truly a tragedy of Shakespearean proportions! Cheerio for now.
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